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INTRODUCTION

Recent political events of historic and global proportion afford
a wealth of challenge and opportunity for international legal
practice. The breakup of the former Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and, in general, the collapse of command-style
central planning as a viable approach to economic organization
seem certain to expedite globalization of markets and increase
the volume of international business transactions. An increase in
transactions means an increase in disputes. While arbitration is
generally considered the preferred device for resolving transnational business disputes,l litigation is frequently unavoidable,
either as a substitute for arbitration or as a consequence of it. 2
As international disputes are litigated and reduced to judgments
in the national courts of various countries, the recognition and
enforcement 3 of foreign judgments will present an expanded
challenge to international legal practice. This Article addresses
one aspect of that challenge: the recognition and enforcement of
foreign country money judgments in the United States.
The United States is the nation most receptive to recognition
I. That arbitration is the vehicle of choice is claimed with almost liturgical uniformity in everything recently published in the field of international commercial arbitration. See, e.g., ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAw AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 22 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that "[m]ost international trade disputes are resolved by arbitration"). For a recent summary of the subject emphasizing
the important role of arbitral institutions, see Richard J. Graving, The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How Good a]ob Are They Doing1, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
319 (1989).
2. See George T. Yates III, Arbitration or Court Litigation for Private International Dispute Resolution: The Lesser of Two Evils, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 224, 226-32 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1984) (reviewing
the factors involved in the choice between litigation and arbitration); Michael Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164, 172-77 (describing two unsuccessful
arbitrations and stating that increased costs and delays are largely inevitable whenever
an arbitration clause provides for an international tribunal of three arbitrators in a neutral forum).
3. See infra note 22.
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of foreign country judgments. 4 This is the conclusion reached in
1987 by the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law. 5 It attributes this receptivity to the influence of the principles and practices engendered by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution6 in respect of sister
state judgments. 7
One manifestation of this receptivity is the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Uniform International Act),
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1962 8 and now said to be in effect in
twenty-two states, including California, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 9 The Uni4. It is important to understand that "foreign country judgment" is one species of
the genus "foreign judgment," which also includes "sister state judgment" within the
U.S. federal system. See infra note 22. This Article focuses on the foreign country judgment; however, the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments often
necessitates an understanding of the treatment of sister state judgments.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 481-488 introductory note (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw]. This work is the best general account of current United States and foreign practice on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that is readily available in
English. See also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601 (1968) (addressing
the subject offoreign adjudications from ajurisprudential point of view); Arthur T. von
Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Judgments-General Theory and the Role ofJurisdictional Requirements, 167 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 20-54 (1980) (updating aspects of Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach); Friedrich K. Juenger, The
Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM.J. COMPo L. 1 (1988)
(conveying a pessimistic outlook on prospects for liberalization of recognition practices); Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation,Judgment of Court of Foreign Country as Entitled
to Enforcement or Extraterritorial Effect in State Court, 13 A.L.RATH 1109 (1982) (collecting
state and federal court cases applying state law); Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Valid
Judgment of Court of Foreign Country as Entitled to Extraterritorial Effect in Federal District Court,

13 A.L.R. FED. 208 (1972) (collecting federal court cases applying federal law).
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § l.
7. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, introductory note; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 98 cmt. b (1969) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS] (comparing foreign and sister state judgments). The
Restatement of Conflicts is more than 20 years old and suffers from what many regard as
a lack of "courage." See, e.g., Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the
Second Restatement ofConflict ofLaws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 264 (1972) (complaining that
a "disappointingly laconic approach seems to have dominated its [the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] treatment of foreign country judgments").
8. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (West 1986
& Supp. 1992) [hereinafter UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT]. A copy of this Act is reproduced as Appendix C.
9. Id. The phrase "said to be in effect" is employed because the versions adopted
in some states depart significantly in certain respects from the uniform model law. For a
discussion of, inter alia, these variations, see infra notes 311-351 and accompanying text.
The abbreviation "Uniform International Act" is employed for several reasons: (I) to

"
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form International Act was designed to "codify" rules that had
long been applied by a majority of state courts in the United
States. lO It provides for the enforcement of recognized foreign
country money judgments "in the same manner as the judgment
of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit."ll
The formula sounds simple, logical, and workable. For the
most part it has been. But in the 1980s, two Texas intermediate
appellate courts ruled it unconstitutionaP2 and a third avoided
that condemnation by reading into the Uniform International Act
(Texas version) what was tantamount to a section on due process
hearing procedures. 13 In mid-1989 the Texas state legislature
obliged the Texas Bar by converting that judicially inferred section into a statutory amendment,14 thereby attempting to cure
the purported unconstitutionality of the Uniform International
Act. 15 That purported unconstitutionality lay in the Uniform
International Act's failure to specify the United States procedures by which a foreign country money judgment is to be
examined for compliance with due process standards: that is, the
Act's failure to provide for due process here on the question of
due process there unless a new common law action is brought on
the foreign judgment.
A 1990 decision of the Texas Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the unamended Act but only on the basis that,
under the facts of the particular case before it, the required due
process hearing would be provided in the course of the separate
distinguish that Act from the 1948 and 1964 Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judg.
ments Acts, which are applicable only to interstate judgments, i.e., sister state judg.
ments, see infra text accompanying notes 45-72; (2) to place emphasis, for reasons of
analytical clarity and convenience, on the international-interstate distinction, rather than
the recognition-enforcement dichotomy. see infra note 22 and text accompanying note
125; and (3) to avoid the inevitable confusion of acronyms such as UFMJRA, UFCMJRA,
or UEFJA.
10. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 261-62.
II. Id. § 3, 13 U.L.A. at 265.
12. Plastics Eng'g Inc. v. Diamond Plastics Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989); Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text.
13. Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text.
14. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.004 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992). A
copy of the,Texas International Act is reproduced as Appendix D.
15. Maria Luisa Flores & Fernando A. Dubove, State Bar Legislative Program: Final
Disposition by 71st Legislature, 52 TEX. BJ. 890 (1989) ("The bill [now codified into law]
corrects defects which recently caused the Court of Appeals to hold the [Uniform International] Act unconstitutional."). For a comprehensive discussion of these cases, see
infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text.
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common law action that had been brought to enforce the foreign
judgment. 16 Since a separate common law action on a sister state
or foreign country judgment has always been available,17 the
Texas Supreme Court's reasoning did not reach the perceived
defects of the Uniform International Act,18 which was designed
to permit "short-cut" procedures as an alternative to enforcement lawsuits. 19
Although the legislature in Texas took remedial action,20 the
problem has not been identified or addressed by the courts of
any other state in which the Uniform International Act has been
adopted. In fact eight states have adopted the Act in substantially its original form since the issue was first identified in
Texas. 21 Thus the question arises whether Texas has illuminated
the path that others should follow or simply conjured up and
"solved" a problem when none in fact existed.
Parts II and III of this Article describe the background of the
Uniform International Act. Part IV surveys the cases decided
under the Act as adopted in Texas. Part V analyzes the recent
cases that declared the Texas International Act unconstitutional.
Part VI considers the due process issue that was the basis of
16. Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters., Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex.
1990), rev'g 776 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). For a comprehensive discussion of
this case, see Sharon N. Freytag & Michelle E. McCoy, Annual Suroey of Texas Law-Conjiict of Laws, 45 Sw. LJ. 149, 194 (1991).
17. See Docksteader, 794 S.W.2d at 761; infra text accompanying note 41.
18. The constitutionality of a statute is usually challenged "as applied," not "on its
face." This was the case in Docksteader. Constitutionality in one application is not necessarily constitutionality in another. See Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 113 S. Ct. 633, 633-34 (1992) (Scalia,]., dissenting from denial of certiorari). This
elementary distinction seems to have escaped one commentator. See John E. Macey,
Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd.: The Arrival of Full Faith and
Credit in Texas, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 378-79 (1992) (opining that the Texas state
legislature "was wasting its time" in 1989 by addressing a problem of purported unconstitutionality that in fact did not exist, as decided in 1990 by the Texas Supreme Court in
Docksteader).
19. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, § 3 cmt., 13 U.L.A. at 265. For a
more thorough discussion of the Uniform International Act, see infra notes 119-140 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 295-310 and accompanying text.
21. Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia have adopted the Act. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-30 to -38 (West Supp.
1991) (adopted in 1988); IDAHO CODE § 10-1401 to -1409 (Michie 1990) (adopted in
1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6268.1-8.8 (West Supp. 1991) (adopted in 1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 548.35 (West 1988) (adopted in 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-48-1 to -9 (Michie
1991) (adopted in 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.90-.94 (Anderson 1991)
(adopted in 1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 22001-22009 (West 1991) (adopted in
1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.6 to -465.13 (Michie 1991) (adopted in 1990).
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those declarations. Part VII explores the Texas 1989 "remedial"
legislation. Finally, Parts VIII and IX assess certain alternative
solutions to the problem that have been or could be adopted in
other states, including a specific legislative proposal.
We begin, for purposes of comparison and historical development, with the distinct but analogous matter of recognition and
enforcement of sister state judgments. 22
II.

SISTER STATE JUDGMENTS AND THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE
ACTS

A.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause

The states, territories, and possessions of the United States are
obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution to recognize and enforce one another's judgments. 23 The policy reasons that underlie the full faith and credit
doctrine are federalism, comity, and res judicata. 24 These broad
principles have the following specific objectives: (I) the public
interest in concluding litigation;25 (2) avoidance of duplication of
22. A word about our terminology is in order:
(a) "Recognition" and "enforcement" are often used conjunctively and often
used synonymously; they are technically different. Recognition must precede
or accompany all enforcement, but not all recognition leads to enforcement.
Some foreign judgments cannot be enforced and can only be recognized, e.g.,
judgments for the defendant, declaratory judgments, judgments on status of
parties or things, and collateral estoppel effects.
See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 481 cmt. b; RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 93 introductory note; see also infra text accompanying notes
125-129.
(b) The term "state" can mean either a sister state in the American Union, a
territorial unit with a distinct body of law (such as a sister state in the American
Union or a political subdivision, like England or Scotland in the United Kingdom), or a politically sovereign unit recognized as such under intemationallaw
(such as the United States or the United Kingdom). Our style is to indicate
which meaning is meant if it is not clear from the context.
(c) The term "foreign" means foreign with respect to the forum. It includes
sister states, foreign nation political subdivisions with their own bodies of law.
and foreign nations. Again, we indicate which when the meaning is not otherwise clear.
Cf 1 ALBERT V. DICEY &J.H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws
27-28 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 11th ed. 1987) (defining "state" as the whole of a
territory that is subject to one sovereign power, thereby rejecting the notion that England or Scotland could be considered as a state, and defining "foreign" as simply not
English); P.M. NORTH & JJ. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAw 9 (12th ed. 1992) (defining "foreign system of law" as a "distinctive legal system
prevailing in a territory other than that in which the court functions").
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Congress enacted legislation in 1948 to clarify implementation of this provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1985).
25. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 98 cmt. b; see also Baldwin v.
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effort; (3) protection of the successful litigant against harassment
or evasive tactics on the part of his opponent; (4) rendering the
choice of forum less dependent on the availability of local
enforcement; (5) fostering national stability and unity; and, in
certain cases, (6) establishing a principle of forum conveniens, or
deference to the rendering forum as the more appropriate
adjudicator. 26
A presumption of validity is accorded a sister statejudgment. 27
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as mandating recognition of such a judgment
"even if it disregards the dominant interest or policy" of the state
in which recognition is sought. 28 This interpretation has been
supported by the rationale that judicial economy and integrity
within the federal system require a strict application of the res
judicata doctrine. 29 Furthermore, it has been argued that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause "reflects the need to weld the states
together as a single nation with utmost freedom of interstate
commerce and migration and with all states respecting each
other's procedures. "30 As an additional justification, it has been
noted that interstate variations in cultural attitudes and commercial practices are not great and that each state's governmental
procedures are subject to the same constitutional limitations. 31
Implicit in this reasoning is a strong presumption that due proIowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931) (stating that "[p]ublic policy
dictates that there be an end of litigation").
26. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 5, at 1603-04; see also Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261,289 (1980) (White,]., concurring) (discussing various policies underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause). The six specific objectives
were formulated by von Mehren and Trautman in the context of international recognition
practice but are likewise applicable, albeit with different weighting, within a federal or
non-unitary national framework. This is not to say that municipal practice should
merely be an echo of international practice, or vice versa. von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 5, at 1604, 1607. There are of course counter-arguments to international
recognition. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
371-72 (1992) (listing distrust of other states and their systems, public policy, propriety
of requiring reciprocity, and differences about jurisdiction).
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Crouse, 298 F. Supp. 1029, 1036-37 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd on
other grounds, 413 F.2d 979 (10th Cir. 1969).
28. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments: A Summary Review of the Situation in the United States, 4 INT'L LAw. 720, 722 (1970); see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 117. But see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note
7, § 103 cmt. b (noting that there are "extremely rare occasions" when this requirement
will give way to a weightier individual interest).
29. See Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 723.
30. Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the
United States, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1605 (1966).
31. Id. at 1605.
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cess requirements were satisfied in the underlying proceedings in
the sister state that rendered the original judgment. 32 This presumption justifies the practice of routinely enforcing sister state
judgments. 33 The presumption can be overcome in a limited
number of cases,' such as lack of jurisdiction 'in the rendering
court or fraud in the procurement ofthejudgment. 34 Judgments
may not be collaterally attacked, however, for errors that, in the
rendering court, were grounds for appeal only.35
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, as implemented by federal
legislation,36 does not specify the mechanics by which sister state
judgments are to be recognized and enforced. 37 Although Congress has the authority to make the judgment of one state directly
binding and immediately enforceable against the judgment
debtor in another state38-much as federal court judgments are
registered in other federal districts 39-it has chosen not to do
SO.40

Until 1948 the sole device for interstate enforcement was a
new action on the sister statejudgment. 41 This is not tantamount
32. ROBERT A. LEFl.AR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 236 (4th ed. 1986).
33. Scoles, supra note 30, at 1605.
34. [d. at 238-41; see also Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 563 (5th CiT. 1989)
("Other than lack of jurisdiction or fraud, there are no other federal grounds which
nullify a state court judgment."); Monrad G. Paulsen, Enforcing the Morury Judgment of a
Sister State, 42 IOWA L. REV. 202, 204 (1957) (stating that "[t]he defenses to a sister state
judgment are limited to lack ofjurisdiction, lack of finality, the running of the statute of
limitations, and payment or discharge in bankruptcy").
35. LEFl.AR ET AL., supra note 32, at 239; see also Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540, 543
(1963) (per curiam) (holding that the proper recourse to challenge an allegedly erroneous judgment is by direct appeal, and not collateral attack); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457,462 (1940) (stating that once jurisdiction is found to exist, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause prohibits collateral attacks on the merits of the decision).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
37. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 971 & n.3 (2d ed. 1992)
(citing M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325 (1839»; see also LEFl.AR ET AL.,
supra note 32, at 233-34; if. Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901) (distinguishing
between a "judgment" and the procedures used to enforce that judgment, and holding
that only the fonner are entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution).
38. The second sentence of Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution authorizes Congress
to prescribe by law "the Effect" to be given to sister state judgments. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1; see LEFl.AR ET AL., supra note 32, at 233-34.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). Ajudgment registered pursuant to this statute has the
same effect as ajudgment of the district court in the district of registration. [d.; see Ohio
Hoist Mfg. Co. v. LiRocchi, 490 F.2d 105 (6th CiT.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
40. Nor has such legislation apparently ever been seriously considered. See, e.g.,
Robert A. Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q REV. 336, 337-38
(1949).
41. LEFl.AR ET AL., supra note 32, at 233; see Paulsen, supra note 34, at 202. The
common law background of enforcing foreign money judgments by commencing a new
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to a trial de novo since res judicata and collateral estoppel apply as
required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 42 But the requirement of a new lawsuit is clearly an "inefficient and wasteful procedure"43 that involves unnecessary "delay, expense and
uncertainty."44 The results of these perceived inadequacies led
to the creation of the 1948 Interstate Act. We now turn our discussion to the substantive terms of that Act.
B.

The 1948 Interstate Act

In 1948 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Commissioners) promulgated the first Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (1948 Interstate Act),
applicable only to sister state judgments. 45
Originally the Commissioners had proposed a simple judgment registration system46 as the procedural mechanism by
which to enforce sister state judgments under the proposed act. 47
The Commissioners' reasoning was that the judgment debtor
had had his day in court and the proposed system, even without
further procedural safeguards, satisfied the requirements of the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. 48 Because due
process requires nothing more than adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard49 once and not a succession of times,50
the judgment debtor, it was believed, would suffer no constitutional wrong under the judgment registration system. 51 In the
final draft of the Act, however, the judgment registration system
was abandoned because it was felt the only way to ensure the
suit on the original judgment is described in Hessel E. Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1136 (1935).
42. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 232-33.
43. Id. at 233.
44. Id. A new lawsuit is not only expensive but "subjects the plaintiff to overcrowded court calendars and dilatory activity by judgment debtors." John C. Chappell
& Floyd Feeney, Note, Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal Registration ofJudgments Statute, 36 N.Y.V. L. REV. 488, 488 (1961); see also WILLIS L.M. REESE ET AL., CONFLICT OF
LAws 238 (9th ed. 1990) (noting that the common law requirement of a new suit on the
judgment is very "time-consuming").
45. VNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 V.L.A. 181 (1986) [hereinafter 1948 INTERSTATE ACT). A copy of this Act is reproduced as Appendix A.
46. For a discussion of the judgment registration procedures, see infra text accompanying notes 64-70.
47. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 234.
48. Leflar, supra note 40, at 346-47.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 347.
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political success of the proposal was by compromise with those
who thought the registration system too radical a change. 52
The resulting compromise was a summary judgment procedure,
less cumbersome than the old common law process but less efficient than registration. 53 It involves the following: application
for registration,54 service of process on judgment debtor55 or
notice to last known address,56 levy on property at any time after
registration,57 pleading of defenses by judgment debtor within
sixty days,58 hearing,59 new personal 60 or quasi in rem judgment,61
and execution after judgment. 62 For reasons discussed below,
the Act was soon replaced by a more streamlined procedure
designed to expedite the recognition of sister state judgements.
C.

The 1964 Interstate Act

The Commissioners followed the 1948 Interstate Act with a
revision in 1964, the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (1964 Interstate Act).63 The prefatory note to
this version succinctly describes the reasoning behind the abandonment of the summary judgment enforcement procedure of
the 1948 Act in favor of a judgment registration system. 64 The
52. /d. at 347-49.
53. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 234-35. The terms "summary judgment procedure" and "judgment registration system" need to be understood with some caution.
They are not terms of art and their usage is not fixed. The authors have adopted Professor Leflar's terminology, but others have used the terms differently. See, e.g., SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 37, at 971 (noting that the 1964 Interstate Act provides for a "summary
proceeding," not "registration"); Werner F. Ebke & Mary E. Parker, Foreign Country
Money-judgments and Arbitral Awards and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States: A Conventional Approach, 24 INT'L LAw. 21, 44 (1990) (noting that the
1964 Interstate Act provides for a "summary judgment-type procedure"); Adolf
Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 18 AM. J. COMPo L. 367, 397
(1970) (noting that the 1948 Interstate Act was a "hybrid registration statute" because it
involved judicial supervision ofthe procedures employed); David L. Woodward, Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in the United States, the United Kingdom and
the European Economic Community, 8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 299, 301 (1983) (noting
that the 1948 Interstate Act "merely restated the common law method").
54. 1948 INTERSTATE ACT, supra note 45, §§ 2,3, 13 V.L.A. at 185, 193.
55. Id. § 4,13 V.L.A. at 194.
56. Id. § 5,13 V.L.A. at 195.
57. !d. § 6, 13 V.L.A. at 195.
58. Id. § 7, 13 V.L.A. at 197.
59. Id. § 8, 13 V.L.A. at 197-98.
60. Id. § 7, 13 V.L.A. at 197.
61. Id. § 12, 13 V.L.A. at 202.
62. Id. § 13, 13 V.L.A. at 203.
63. VNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 V.L.A. 149 (1986) [hereinafter 1964 INTERSTATE ACT]. A copy of this Act is reproduced as Appendix B.
64. Id. at 150.
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Commissioners noted that although the summary judgment system was preferable to its common law predecessor, court intervention was neither constitutionally necessary nor judicially
efficient. 65 In the interest of providing "the enacting state with a
speedy and economical method of doing that which it is required
to do by the Constitution of the United States,"66 the Commissioners offered the states the option of a streamlined registration
system. The system, now in effect in forty-one of the fifty
states,67 has for the most part been quite successful. It involves
the following: filing of foreign judgment,68 notice to judgment
debtor at last known address,69 and execution within specified
period unless stay granted following appropriate showing by
judgment debtor. 70 In substance this is the same practice as provided by Congress in 1948 for the inter-district enforcement of
the judgments of federal district courts. 71 One difference is that
the federal statute does not even refer to notice to the judgment
debtor. 72
In the meantime the Commissioners had focused their attention on the analogous problem of the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments. It is to this problem that we
now tum.
III.

FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS AND THE UNIFORM
INTERNATIONAL ACT

Foreign country judgments, as distinguished from sister state
judgments, do not enjoy the protection of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 73 There is no obligation on the part of the state
65. /d.
66. Id.
67. The nine states that have not adopted the Act are: California, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont. 1964 INTERSTATE ACT, supra note 63, at 7 (West Supp. 1992); if. infra note 314.
Only Nebraska still retains the 1948 Interstate Act. 1948 INTERSTATE ACT, supra note 45,
at 21 (West Supp. 1992). But see special treatment of Missouri, infra note 314.
68. 1964 INTERSTATE ACT, supra note 63, § 2, 13 U.L.A. at 154.
69. /d. § 3, 13 U.L.A. at 172.
70. [d. § 4,13 U.L.A. at 175.
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
72. While federal practice is beyond the scope of this Article, an in-depth discussion
of § 1963 can be found in 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2787, 2865 (1973); ;ee also Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265 (8th
Cir. 1965) (indicating that for certain purposes registration equates with a new judgment on the original judgment).
73. Article IV, § I of the Constitution unambiguously states that it applies only to
the "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST.
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and federal courts of the United States to recognize automatically
the judgments of courts sitting in foreign countries. 74 Although
it has been suggested that federalization of this area 75 by treaty, 76
statute,77 or federal common law 7s would be constitutional, as
art. IV, § I (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 31 cmt.
c.
74. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 722.
75. The term "federalization" is used here to refer to any action by the federal
government that would result in the preemption of state law by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause in Article VI of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see Robert C. Casad, Issue
Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 79 (1984) (indicating that the arguments for federalization are "strong" and the arguments against it
amount to little more than advocacy of "inertia"); Richard D. Freer, Eries Mid-Life Crisis,
63 TuL. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1989) (stating that "[t]he federal courts are simply ignoring
Erie ... by stacking the deck against the application of state law"). For the leading
Supreme Court case discussing when federal law can be said to have preempted inconsistent state law, see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
76. See, e.g., LEFt-AR ET AL., supra note 32, at 252-53; Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 73233; George A. Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 53
NOTRE DAME LAw. 734, 734-37 (1978); if. Kurt H. Nadelmann,Jurisdictionally Improper
Fora in Treaties on Recognition ofJudgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
995 (1967) (discussing various treaties in force in the European Economic Community).
Then-professor Ginsburg has commented that the treaty approach appears to be more
prevalent in civil law countries. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 732-33. A brilliant analysis
of the treaty approach, including the possibility of U.S. adherence to the BrusselsLugano convention scheme, see infra note 134, is set forth in Arthur T. von Mehren,
Recognition of United States Judgments Abroad and Foreign Judgments in the United
States. Would International Conventions Be Useful? 1-19 (Apr. 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics)
(summarizing remarks made by Professor von Mehren at the Max-Planck-Institut in
Hamburg, Germany in 1991; full version to be published by the journal of the MaxPlanck-Institut in late 1992 or 1993). Currently under study by the Hague Conference
on Private International Law is a proposal by the United States, prepared by Professor
von Mehren, for consideration and possible negotiation of a general multilateral treaty
on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of judgments. Hague Conference
on Private International Law: Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting on Enforcements ofJudgments, DEP'T. ST. Doc. LlPIL Doc.AC 45/HC/6 (Prelim. Doc. No. 19 of
Nov. 1992) (on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and Ecnomics).
77. Professor Casad implicitly acknowledges the potential for congressional action
in this area, but then dismisses such action by stating that it is unlikely to occur. Casad,
supra note 75, at 79.
78. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 253. The viability of a federal common law
approach is very problematic. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie stated that "[t]here is no
federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State .... [a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938); see also John D. Brummett, Jr., Note, The Preclusive Effect of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States and Federal Choice of Law: The Role ofthe Erie Doctrine Reassessed, 33
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 83, 109 (1988) (stating that "it is appropriate to suggest that the Erie
doctrine is inapplicable as a choice-of-Iaw directive for federal-diversity courts in the
foreign-country judgment setting"). But see Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 504 (1988) ("But we have held that a few areas, involving 'uniquely federal

1992]

Uniform International Act

749

well as desirable because of its close relationship to foreign
affairs,79 Congress has not chosen to do so. Nor has the U.S.
Supreme Court conclusively spoken for the nation on this
issue. 8o Consequently, under the Supreme Court's decisions in
Erie 81 and Klaxon,82 state law largely governs the recognition of
foreign country judgments. 83 .
The following subsection focuses on the Texas common law
because it is similar to that of other states and because it is the
background of the Uniform International Act as adopted,
declared unconstitutional at the intermediate appellate level, and
interests,' ... are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to
federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced ... by federal law of a content
prescribed ... by the courts, so-called 'federal common law.' "); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) ("The rights and duties oflhe United States on
commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law.").
79. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (holding an Oregon statute unconstitutional because denial of inheritance rights to nonresident aliens whose
countries did not grant reciprocity to U.S. citizens involved the state in foreign affairs
and international relations, areas within the exclusive domain of Congress and the executive branch); see also Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 733 (noting that this area of the law is
susceptible to federalization because of its "close association with foreign relations").
80. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 98 cmt. f (West Supp. 1989); Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 722. But if. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
425 (1964) (holding that the act-of-state doctrine is exclusively "an aspect of federal
law"). One commentary stated that it "appears extremely unlikely" that the Supreme
Court would reinstate the doctrine of reciprocity enunciated in Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895). Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 37, 48
(1974); see infra text accompanying notes 96-111. The Supreme Court might avoid the
issue by applying the Erie doctrine and leaving the matter to the states, or it might "federalize" the area per Sabbatino and defer to the political branches of government. See
Homburger, supra note 53, at 389-90, 405 (stating that it is "unlikely" that the Court
would confirm Hilton reciprocity as a federally required rule).
81. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
82. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
83. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 481 cmt. a; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 98 cmt. f; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay,
223 U.S. 185 (1912) (holding that no reviewable federal question was presented by a
state court's failure to accord conclusive effect to a foreign country judgment); Willis
L.M. Reese, The Status in This Country ofJudgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783,
787 nn.21 & 25 (1950) (citing various stale court cases that have held that the measure
of respect that is owing to judgments of foreign nations is solely an issue of state law);
Freer, supra note 75, at 1090. For a detailed discussion of the alternatives available for
changing the current U.S. law on recognition and enforcement of foreign country
money-judgments, see generally Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-judgments
in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 253 (1991) (comparing the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
with approaches based on treaties, federal statutes, federal common law, and federal
procedural rules). For the treaty alternative see supra note 76.
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amended in Texas. 84

A.

Common Law Recognition Practice

Despite some variations in local practice, most states of the
Union tend to recognize valid foreign country judgments that are
not subject to additional proceedings, other than execution, in
the country of the rendering court. 85 That such a judgment is
subject to appeal or modification does not deprive it of its character as a final judgment. 86 As with interstate judgments, the normal common law mode for enforcing a foreign country judgment
is a new suit on the original judgment. 87
A pair of early Texas cases suggest the path the development
of the common law has followed, in Texas and elsewhere in the
United States. The first court in Texas to decide this issue
reported its decision in Phillips v. Lyons 88 in 1846, based on an
action commenced in the independent Republic of Texas before
its annexation in 1845 by the United States. In Phillips, the Texas
Supreme Court faced the question whether conclusive effect
could be given to a Louisianajudgment. 89 Judge Lipscomb, writing for the majority, overturned the lower court's decision that
the judgment should be recognized. He ruled that "foreign
judgments, in the absence of legislative enactments, are held in
most of the states, to be only prima facie evidence. "90
In the same year as Phillips, however, another Texas case
addressing the same issue reached a different conclusion. In
Wellborn v. Carr,91 the same court was asked to determine whether
a judgment rendered in Alabama should be given conclusive
effect in light of the court's decision in Phillips.92 The court held
84. See infra notes 177-205.
85. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 481 cmt. e; see also
Reese, supra note 83, at 783-85.
86. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 481 cmt. e.
87. See Homburger, supra note 53, at 378; Yntema, supra note 41, at 1136.
88. Phillips v. Lyons, 1 Tex. 392 (1846). This case was brought before the State of
Texas was annexed by the United States and therefore during the time when Texas was
still an independent republic. Accordingly, the court viewed the Louisiana judgment at
issue as a foreign country judgment. See R. Doak Bishop, Obtaining Recognition and
Enforcement Of Foreign-Country Judgments In Texas, 45 TEX. BAR]' 287, 288 (1982); infra text
accompanying note 91.
89. Phillips, 1 Tex. at 396.
90. Id. at 396-97.
91. Wellborn v. Carr, 1 Tex. 463 (1846). As was the case in Phillips, the Alabama
judgment was considered a foreign country judgment since Texas had not yet been
annexed by the United States. See Bishop, supra note 88, at 288.
92. Phillips, 1 Tex. at 398-99.
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that the judgment should be given conclusive effect, and distinguished Phillips on the basis that the judgment in Phillips was in
personam as opposed to the judgment in Wellborn, which was in
rem. 93 Judge Lipscomb, speaking again for the court, stated that
"the judgment of the forum rei sitae is held absolutely conclusive."94
He reasoned that judgments based on in rem proceedings were
absolutely conclusive "by the general consent of nations" as well
as by "universal obligation. "95
The common law theory of "prima facie evidence" of foreign
country judgments articulated by Judge Lipscomb in the Phillips
case has not survived. Judicial interpretation of the effect to be
given foreign country judgments has shifted from the prima facie
rule to the modern approach of conclusive effect, but without the
Wellborn limitation to in rem proceedings.
In 1895 the U.S. Supreme Court declared the modem
approach in Hilton v. Guyot. 96 According to the Hilton Court,
[W]here there has been an opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting
the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system ofjurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration ofjustice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason
why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the
merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this
country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial
or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact. 97

The key concept here is "comity," a rather elusive term that signifies a posture "somewhere between duty and courtesy."98
93. Wellborn, 1 Tex. at 468-69.
94. [d. at 469 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 49495 (8th ed. 1883)).
95. Wellborn, 1 Tex. at 466 (citing STORY, supra note 94, at 494-95). See generally
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). The Earle opinion contained
what is considered to be the first pronouncement of the comity doctrine by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Court's opinion characterized comity as "a part of the voluntary
law of nations" and posited that there would be numerous instances "in which, by the
general practice of civilized countries, the laws of the one, will, by the comity of nations,
be recognised and executed in another." [d. at 589.
96. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
97. [d. at 202-03.
98. Courtland H. Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHIO ST.
LJ. 291, 293 (1963); see Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
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The Hilton Court also advanced the doctrine of "reciprocity."99
This doctrine requires denial of recognition to the judgment of a
foreign country if the law of the country where judgment was
rendered would not give res judicata effect to the judgment of a
court sitting in the United States. lOO This requirement was
intended to induce foreign governments to "modernize" their
recognition procedures. IOI
The reciprocity requirement, however, leaves private litigants
at the mercy of public policies. 102 The treatment offoreignjudgments depends on the position taken by the government of the
other country involved. 103 One commentator has suggested that
"[t]he rule ignores the basic policy underlying the recognition
435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that comity "is not a rule of law, but one of practice,
convenience, and expediency"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
A broader definition of the term might be "expediency" while a narrower one might
be "reciprocity." Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 373-74 (1945). See generally Herbert Barry, Comity, 12 VA.
L. REV. 353 (1926); R. Doak Bishop & Susan Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 16 INT'L LAw. 425, 426 (1982) (collecting various definitions of the term "comity"); Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9
(1966) (surveying the history of the doctrine); Note, 9 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1896) (commenting on the Hilton case).
99. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 210.
100. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 250.
10 I. See Beverly M. Carl, Recognition of Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations-and
Vice Versa, 13 Hous. L. REV. 680, 685 (1976).
102. Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect ofa Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U. L. REV.
752,764 (1955) (stating that by a court's insisting on reciprocity "a national judgment is
confused with a judgment for a national").
103. See Carl, supra note 101, at 684-85; Hilari6n Arnaldo Martinez Uanes, Note,
Foreign Nation Judgments: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Florida and the
Status of Florida Judgments Abroad, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 588, 628 (1979). Foreign countries
may simply refuse to enforce judgments rendered in the United States. See Ernest G.
Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YALE LJ. 188,205 (1919).

Foreign countries may, on the other hand, insist on reciprocity, but this can lead to a
circulus inextricabilis, especially if there is an irrebuttable presumption against the equiva-

lence of the U.S. suit-on-a-judgment mechanism, or if there is a rebuttable presumption
against U.S. reciprocity in the absence of U.S. statute or precedent. See Lorenzen, supra,
at 206 (illustrating the c;rculus inextricabilis); ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND UNrrED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD 25 (Ronald A. Brand ed., A.B.A.
Sec. Int'l L. & Prac. 1992) [hereinafter ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS] (stating "there
is no easy exit from this analytical circle."); RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAw 292-93 & n.14 (5th ed. 1988) (noting that courts in civil law jurisdictions have
inferred absence of reciprocity in the absence of specific statutory provisions); H.C. Gutteridge, Reciprocity in Regard to Foreign Judgments, 13 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 53 (1932)
(discussing the procedure used in civil law countries, known as exequatur, to determine
whether a judgment will be enforced); Homburger, supra note 53, at 376-78 (discussing
the exequatur procedure); Kurt H Nadelmann, Non-Recognition ofAmerican Money Judgments
Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236, 251 (1956). It has been suggested
that foreign country courts ought to regard the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
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and enforcement of foreign-nation judgments-putting an end to
litigation."lo4 This aspect of the Hilton opinion was increasingly
criticized and attracted scant approval. Most state courts have
either narrowly applied the reciprocity requirement or rejected it
outright. 105 Scholars have uniformly condemned it. 106
Law as evidence of reciprocal American recognition practice. LOWENFELD, supra note 26,
at 391.
The harshness of the reciprocity requirement may be diluted somewhat, however,
through "divisible" application; that is, by application only to judgments of the same
kind and content as the one at bar. See, e.g., GEORGES R. DELAUME, LAw AND PRACTICE OF
TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 205 (1988) (noting that German law has shifted from a
global to a selective approach); Dieter Martiny, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
MoneyJudgments in the Federal Republic of Germany, 35 AM.J. COMPo L. 721, 751 (1987)
("Reciprocity is divisible. Partial reciprocity for one or more specified classes of judgments ... is sulficient."); George J. Roman, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Various Foreign Countries 20 (1984) (manuscript available at Library of
Congress, Law Library) (stating that "divisibility" is the current rule for the Federal
Republic of Germany).
Lack of reciprocity, of course, is not the only basis on which a forum may refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment. It may simply invoke the defense of "public policy" as a bar, an approach commonly employed in European civil law jurisdictions.
See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra, at 866 (noting that civil law countries generally refuse
recognilion and enforcement of a foreign judgment if il violales local public policy);
Hans-Michael Kraus, Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Republic of Germany-Some Aspects of Public Policy, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 195, 197 (1982) (noting that foreign
judgments Ihal violate German public policy, by either contravening "good morals" or
the purpose of German law, will not be recognized).
104. Bishop, supra nOle 88, at 293.
105. The leading state case rejecting the reciprocity requirement is Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantiques, 152 N.E. 121, 123-24 (N.Y. 1926) (limiting its interpretation of Hilton to the questions actually decided); see also von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 80, at 48 (asserting that Hilton only requires reciprocity in the very limited
situation of its particular facts). Subsequent cases in both state and federal courts have
followed this restrictive reading. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 37, at 1000 & nn.6-8
(collecting state and federal cases); Wakefield, supra note 5, at 1110-17 (collecting cases
applying state law). The cases vary in their interpretations of whether the court in Johnston narrowly construed the reciprocity requirement, e.g., Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 614 F.2d
1286 (2d Cir. 1979), or rejected it, e.g., Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco
(Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F. Supp. 610, 615 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also LEFLAR ET
AL., supra note 32, at 250 (noting that while some state courts have "reject[ed] the doctrine," others have "sought to limit it narrowly").
106. See, e.g., Juenger, supra note 5, at 32 (stating that the reciprocity requirement is
"unfair" to private litigants); Lenhoff, supra note 102, at 776-79 (asserting that the "progressive trend" is to leave matters of reciprocity to the political branches of government); Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical
Analysis, 16 LA. L. REV. 465, 473 (1956) (stating that the Supreme Court's analysis of the
reciprocity issue in Hilton was "absolutely wrong"); Scoles, supra note 30, at 1605
(describing the Hilton case as "infamous"); Robert A. Sedler, Recognition of ForeignJudgments and Decrees, 28 Mo. L. REV. 432, 468 (1963) (characterizing the Hilton concept of
retorsion, or reciprocity, as "primitive"); Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in lhe United Slates, 9 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 44, 50 (1962) (positing that the doc-
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Hilton's precedential value today, moreover, is questionable for
several reasons. First, the reciprocity requirement was enunciated in a case where the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction was based on diversity rather than federal question
jurisdiction. 107 Today such cases would dearly be governed by
state law. IDS Second, the Supreme Court's careful wording of the
reciprocity doctrine in Hilton has been construed so as to restrict
its application only to cases in which a foreign plaintiff attempts
to enforce a judgment against a U.S. citizen. 109 According to one
authority, the effect of these two considerations on Hilton is "to
drain it of real significance." 110 Its authority for reciprocity is
therefore "dubious" at besLll1
Over the ensuing years, the influence of Hilton in Texas, as to
both comity and reciprocity, was ambiguous. On the eve of
adopting the Uniform International Act in 1981, the status of foreign country judgments in Texas was problematic. 1l2 Two cases
held that foreign country judgments could be refused recognition due to lack of notice and lack of jurisdiction. 113 But these
defects would not have survived the Hilton criteria in any case.I 14
The only Texas case that exhibited a positive attitude towards
trine of reciprocity does not have "any commendable quality"); see also Barbara Kulzer,
Some Aspects of Enforceability of Foreign Judgments: A Comparative Summary, 16 BUFF. L. REV.
84, 90 & nn.36-37 (stating that various commentators have labeled reciprocity as
"patently undesirable"). But if. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 5, at 1661-62 (speculating that French recognition of German judgments may have been the result of German insistence on reciprocity).
107. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1988).
108. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The purposes behind the Erie decision, preventing
vertical forum shopping, Erie, 304 U.S. at 76, and establishing uniformity of decisions
between state and federal courts by eliminating the creation of federal common law, id.
at 78, would certainly support the proposition that Hilton's precedential value is limited.
See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 37, at 1000.
109. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 170 (1895); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 481 cmt. d (stating that Hilton created a limited reciprocity requirement), § 481 reporters' notes 1; von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 80, at 48.
But if. LOWENFELD, supra note 26, at 388-89 (noting that some persons understand Hilton
to mean that no French judgment would be enforced in the United States without the
right of the judgment debtor to raise defenses).
110. Reese, supra note 83, at 793.
Ill. [d. at 800; see also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 80, at 48.
112. See Carl, supra note 101, at 685-86; see also infra text accompanying notes 115117. For a recent discussion of cases by a federal court applying Texas law, see Hunt v.
BP Exploration Co. [Hunt I], 492 F. Supp. 885, 892-94 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
113. Schacht v. Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Gas Butano, S.A. v.
Rodriguez, 375 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
114. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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giving conclusive effect to foreign country judgments was Banco
ROSS.115 In that case, from 1915, the majority quoted
the central passage on comity from the Hilton opinion almost verbatim. 116 This, however, was "double" dictum since the court
refused to enforce the judgment on grounds not involving the
absence of reciprocity. 117

Minero v.

B.

The Uniform International Act

In an attempt to standardize recognition and enforcement procedures among the states as to foreign country judgments, and to
address the perceived deficiencies of Hilton, 118 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws presented to
the states in 1962 a Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Uniform International Act).119 The purpose of the Uniform International Act was to facilitate recognition of foreign
country judgments in the United States so as to "make it more
likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized
abroad."120 The second half of this formulation is often
overlooked. 121
115.

Banco Minero v. Ross, 172 S.W. 711 (Tex. 1915).

116.
117.

Id. at 714 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895».
Id. at 714-15 (holding that the defendant had been denied his constitutional

right to be heard in a Mexican proceeding that was "arbitrary in its nature and summary
in its execution").
118. See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
119. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8. This Act was presented 14 years
after the 1948 Interstate Act and two years before the 1964 Interstate Act. Bearing this
sequence in mind is critical to an understanding of what the Commissioners thought
they were accomplishing with the Uniform International Act. E.g., infra text accompanying notes 218-243.
120. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 261; see
also SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 103, at 293 ("The purpose of the Act is simply to
ease the burden of a litigant who, in seeking enforcement abroad of an American judgment, may have to inform the foreign court of the rules which would be applied here in a
converse case."); Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act, Proceedings in
Committee of the Whole 3 (Aug. 5,1961) (remarks of Professor Kurt H. Nadelmann, codrafter of the Uniform International Act) (unpublished transcript, on file with The George
Washington Journal of International Law and Economics) [hereinafter 1961 Proceedings]
("The aim is, as I understand it, to facilitale enforcement of our own judgments
abroad."). For thorough discussions on the enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad, see
generally DELAUME, supra note 103, at 199-222; ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
WORLDWIDE (Charles Platto ed., 1989); ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS ABROAD
(Philip R. Weems ed., 1991); VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS ch. 12 (1991); ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra
note 103, at 51-192.
121. See, e.g., Kevin C. Nash, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Texas, 3 INT'L Bus. L.
10, II (1989) (positing that "[t]he original purpose of the Foreign Country Money Judg.
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The Uniform International Act applies only to foreign country
money judgments. It provides for recognition in accordance with
the Act's terms and for enforcement "in the same manner as the
judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and
credit."122 Thus it deals with recognition in one way, and with
enforcement in another. More specifically, the Uniform International Act (1) establishes standards, but no procedure, for recognition, and (2) assigns enforcement to whatever procedures are
in force in the state of the forum. 123 In the year of its promulgation, 1962, that meant enforcement either by a new suit on the
judgment or by utilization of the summary procedures of the
1948 Interstate Act. The Commissioners' comment to section 3
of the Uniform International Act specifically contemplates that
the "method of enforcement will be that of the [Interstate Act] of
1948 in a state having enacted that Act." 124
Although the terms "recognition" and "enforcement" are
often used interchangeably, their meanings are distinct, and this
distinction is critical to understanding problems in the drafting
and application of the Uniform International Act. 125 All
"enforcement" involves or presupposes "recognition," but not
all "recognition" involves "enforcement." Recognition "refers
to the res judicata status of a foreign judgment" and takes place
when the foreign adjudication is held to bind the parties.I 26
Enforcement, on the other hand, connotes the ordering of relief
based on the foreign judgment}27 In the United States, as
ments Act was to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign country money
judgments in Texas").
122. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, § 3, 13 U.L.A. at 265.
123. By specifying grounds for nonrecognition, the Act implicitly provides standards
for recognition. /d. § 4, 13 U.L.A. at 268.
124. [d. § 3 cmt., 13 U.L.A. at 265. There is no indication that the Commissioners
ever contemplated the possibility of enforcement procedures more expeditious than
those set forth in the 1948 Interstat.e Act. Homburger, supra note 53, at 399 n.175.
125. See Yntema, supra note 41, at 1132 (stating that the question of enforcement is
analytically distinct from the question of whether a judgment is entitled to extraterritorial recognition); see also GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 740 (2d ed. 1992)
(analogizing recognition to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and
defining enforcement as occurring when a court uses coercion to compel a defendant to
satisfy a foreign judgment).
126. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 721; see Juenger, supra note 5, at 5.
127. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 721; Juenger, supra note 5, at 5; see also BORN &
WESTIN, supra note 125, at 740; HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 4 (3d ed. 1986) ("For enforcement, a plaintiff invokes the court
processes of the forum to vindicate his foreign judgment. Recognition, where money
judgments are involved, simply requires a dismissal of plaintiff's action. Where other
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already noted, enforcement of foreign country judgments has
been traditionally effectuated by means of a suit for a domestic
judgment predicated on the foreign judgment. 128 Under this
traditional approach, the theoretically independent step of recognition was subsumed into the new lawsuit seeking enforcement. 129 The Uniform International Act, however, clearly
separates these steps, assigning enforcement to procedures in
effect for the enforcement of sister state judgments. What of recognition standing alone?
In a lacuna of rather startling dimension, the Uniform International Act makes no provision for the procedure to be used in
determining eligibility for recognition. Conceivably this could be
rolled into the enforcement phase where appropriate, but recognition apart from enforcement arises in a variety of contexts,
such as actions for declaratory judgments, actions regarding status, and actions in which a foreign judgment is offered by way of
bar or estoppel. 130 Yet the Uniform International Act establishes
no procedure by which its standards can be applied when recognition alone is sought. 131 Moreover, because of the Uniform
International Act's separation of the recognition and enforcement steps,132 enforcement, which presupposes recognition, is
necessarily predicated upon a determination for which no procedure has been provided. 133
In contrast, the regime obtaining in the European Communities provides explicitly that recognition questions will be decided
either by the court that would otherwise hear questions of
enforcement if recognition is a principal issue in the dispute, or
by the court seized with the principal proceedings if recognition
judicial actions, such as a divorce decree, are involved, the consequences of recognition
may be more complex."); Yntema, supra note 41, at 1132 (asserting that how a foreign
judgment is to be enforced is a question analytically distinct from the extent to which it
is entitled to extraterritorial recognition).
128. George A. Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil judgments,
53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 734, 748-49 (1978) (stating that a new action resembling the old
English action on a debt is the common law procedure for enforcing foreign judgments);
see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 100 cmt. b.
129. "Recognition is inherent in enforcement of a judgment." ALAN DASHWOOD ET
AL., A GUIDE TO THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENTION 38 (1987).
130. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 481 cmt. b; see also
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, § 93.
131. For a discussion of possible explanations for this silence, see infra notes 239243 and accompanying text.
132. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, § 3, 13 U.L.A. at 265.
133. See infra notes 176-205, 212-243 and accompanying text.
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is merely an incidental issue in the dispute. 134
The Uniform International Act provides both mandatory and
discretionary grounds for denying recognition to foreign country
money judgments. 135 The mandatory grounds are based on lack
of due process and lack of jurisdiction. 136 Specifically, recogni134. See European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done Sept. 27,1968, 1972J.0. (L 299) 32, 8
I.L.M. 229 (1969) [hereinafter Brussels Convention] (giving "full faith and credil" to
judicial decisions among European Economic Community members; sometimes referred
to as the European Full Faith and Credit Convention); see also DASHWOOD ET AL., supra
note 129, at 35-46, 146-75 (discussing the recognition and enforcement of judgments
under the Brussels Convention). A consolidated and updated version of the Brussels
Convention, following several amendments, is set forth in European Communities:
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgment in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1990 OJ. (C 189) 1-34,29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) (consolidated and updated version
of the Brussels Convention of 1968 and the Protocol of 1971, following the 1989 accession of Spain and Portugal). For a discussion of the provisions of the convention, see,
e.g., Lee S. Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of the
Provisions of the Convention on jurisdiction and Enforcement ofjudgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 24 INT'L & COMPo L.Q 44, 56-58 (1975) (describing recognition and enforcement); Peter Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement ofjudgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 AM. J. COMPo L.
149, 167-71 (1968).
The principles of the Brussels Convention were made available to members of the
European Free Trade Association by the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See European Communities-European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done Sept. 16,1988,1988 OJ. (L 319) 9, 28
I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention] (giving "full faith and credit" to
judicial decisions among EEC and EFTA members). Reports on the two conventions,
with valuable chronology and commentary, appear at European Communities: Reports
on Conventions on jurisdiction and the Enforcement of judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1990 OJ. (C 198) 35-122,29 I.L.M. 1470 (1990). For a thorough and
comprehensive discussion of these treaties and protocols, see generally PETER BYRNE,
THE EEC CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 104-49
(1990); PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
1345-1556 (1987) (discussing, inter alia, the requirements under the Brussels Convention for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments); Michael Bogdan, The "Common Market" for judgments: The Extension of the EEC jurisdiction and Enforcement Treaty to
Nonmember Countries, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 113 (1990) (explaining the relationship
between the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and describing the effect of the treaties
on domiciliaries of non-signatories). For a recent and well-organized exposition on recognition and enforcement of judgments under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions,
see NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 22, at 411-44.
135. The grounds for nonrecognition are generally the same as those set forth in the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. Compare UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra
note 8, § 4, 13 U.L.A. at 268 (setting out three mandatory and six discretionary grounds
for nonrecognition) with RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 482
(setting forth two mandatory and six discretionary grounds for nonrecognition). The
differences between the two are discussed in Ebke & Parker, supra note 53, at 30-43; see
also infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
136. The use of the words "due process" is not meant to imply U.S. constitutional
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tion must be denied when: "(1) the judgment was rendered under
a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or (3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter." 137 It should be noted that the foreign procedures need be only compatible with U.S.-style due process; they
need not be identical. 138
Discretionary grounds for nonrecognition include those cases
where: the defendant did not receive notice in sufficient time to
defend; the judgment was obtained by fraud; the claim is repugnant to the forum's public policy; the judgment conflicts with
another final judgment; the judgment was contrary to an agreement to settle disputes otherwise than by litigation, e.g., by arbitration; and forum non conveniens if foreign jurisdiction was based
only on personal service. 139 Notably absent from the list of
mandatory and discretionary grounds for nonrecognition is the
absence of reciprocity.140 But several states, including Texas,
introduced a modification to include absence of reciprocity as a
mandatory or discretionary ground for nonrecognition.
We tum now to the Texas version of the Uniform International
Act, both as necessary background to what followed and as concrete exemplar for other enacting states.
IV.

THE TEXAS INTERNATIONAL ACT

Texas adopted the Uniform International Act in 1981 with two
noteworthy modifications (Texas International Act).141 In the
title of the legislation, "Country" was inserted after "Foreign" to
due process, but only due process in the sense of "fundamental fairness." Therefore, a
U.S. court may only scrutinize the procedures employed in the foreign forum for compatibility with U.S. domestic notions of due process; they need not be identical. See UNIFORM
INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, § 4(a)(l) & emt., 13 U.L.A. at 268 (stating that "a
mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition").
137. See UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, §§ 4, 5, 13 U.L.A. at 268, 272.
138. See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1987)
(citing Illinois' version of the Uniform International Act as mandating only "compatible" and not "identical" procedures); infra note 217.
139. See UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, § 4, 13 U.L.A. at 268; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 482; see also Ginsburg, supra note 28, at
727-29, 735-36 (listing permissive grounds for nonrecognition).
140. See UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, § 4, 13 U.L.A. at 268; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 482.
141. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001-.008 (West 1986) (formerly TEX.
CIV. STAT. art. 2328b-6, recodified in 1985 without significant change except that the
uniform interpretation provision was deleted because it was covered by TEX. GOV'T
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make sure that no one .was misled into thinking it referred to the
kind of "foreign" judgment whose provenance is merely a sister
state,l42 The more critical modification, however, was the insertion of an additional discretionary ground for nonrecognition:
lack of reciprocity.143 As· the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
observed shortly after adoption of the Texas International Act,
"Texas' amendment of the Uniform [International] Act to
include a reciprocity provision is especially ironic given that the
Act was designed to be a modem, forward-looking statute which
discarded what were considered to be outmoded and discredited
doctrines." 144
The Texas International Act, like the Uniform International
Act, deals only with monetary judgments awarded or denied in
foreign countries,145 It provides that recognized foreign country
judgments are "conclusive between the parties" and are
"enforceable in the same manner as a judgment of a sister state
that is entitled to full faith and credit." 146 Enforcement is contingent on recognition, but is then available under the Texas version of the 1964 Interstate Act, adopted at the same time as the
Texas International Act, as an alternative to the common law
CODE ANN. § 311.028 (West 1986». Section 36.002(b) states that the provisions of the
Act do not apply to judgments rendered prior to June 17, 1981. [d. § 36.002(b).
142. /d. § 36.003; see also Carl, supra note 101, at 690 (recommending that Texas
follow New York's approach by adding the word "country" to avoid potential confusion
with sister state judgments). The change was reflected in the Act's definitions. TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001(1), (2) (West 1986).
143. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (West 1986).
144. Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 665 F.2d 515, 516 n.2 (5th Cir. Unit
A Dec. 1981) (vacating and remanding the district court's pre-enactment judgment recognizing a Canadian judgment for a hearing on the question of reciprocity as a result of
the post-judgment enactment of the Texas International Act). In Trentham, the Fifth
Circuit indicated that the Texas legislature had sent a "clear message. . . that foreign
judgments which would not be reciprocally recognized if made in Texas are not
favored." [d. at 518-19. The irony of reverting to reciprocity, albeit discretionary, is
accentuated by the views of a federal district court in the Fifth Circuit, expressed shortly
before the adoption of the Texas Act, that "Texas courts will not hereafter adopt this
oft-criticized concept [of reciprocity]." Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. [Hunt I], 492 F.
Supp. 885, 899 (N.D. Tex. 1980). The federal view of current Texas law on reciprocity
is exemplified in Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000 (5th
Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court's refusal to recognize an Abu Dhabi judgment
on the grounds of nonreciprocity did not constitute an abuse of discretion). But see
DELAUME, supra note 103, at 207 (stating that "it seems that no American case since
Hilton has refused recognition to a foreign country judgment on the sole ground of lack
of reciprocity"). The authors found no state court cases that directly addressed this
issue at the time this Article was written.
145. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001(2) (West 1986).
146. [d. § 36.004.
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enforcement approach. 147 Certain of the grounds for nonrecognition clearly implicate due process concerns:
(a) A foreign country judgment is not conclusive if: (1) the
judgment was rendered under a system that does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; [and]
(b) A foreign country judgment need not be recognized if: (I)
the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign country did
not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to
defend. 148
At the time of the adoption of the Texas International Act, the
Texas legislature intended to address the following problems:
1. Lack of adequate procedures in the state for enforcing
foreign country money judgments; 149
2. Growing concern over the indefinite and sometimes
arbitrary criteria for recognizing foreign country money judgments; 150 and
.
3. Need to facilitate and, it was hoped, to assure, the recognition and enforcement of Texas judgments abroad. 151
Prior to the adoption of the Texas'International Act, citizens of
Texas had difficulty persuading foreign courts to recognize and
enforce Texas judgments. 152 The problem was more pronounced in civil law countries, where reliance is primarily on
codified or statutory law rather than on judicial decisions, and
where proof of reciprocity is quite often required. 153 Mexico, for
example, requires reciprocity and will enforce a judgment from
another country only to the extent that a valid Mexican judgment
is enforceable in such other country .154
Proponents of the Uniform International Act for Texas were
147. ld. § 35.001-.008 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
148. ld. § 36.005(a)(l), (b)(l) (emphasis added).
149. For a discussion of these deficiencies in the contexl of the Uniform International Act, which was adopted in almost its entirety, see supra notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 102-131 and accompanying text.
151. Carl, supra note 101, at 697 (stating that "the Act should serve to secure recognition of Texas judgments by that large group of nations that insist upon reciprocity").
152. W. Frank Newton, Annual Suroey of Texas Law-Conflict of Laws, 36 SW. LJ. 397,
431 (1982); see also Carl, supra note 101, at 686-87.
153. See Carl, supra note 101, at 686-87 (discussing the possibility of this problem
arising under Mexican civil law).
154. ld. The reciprocity requirement does not apply, however, to questions of Mexican recognition not accompanied by enforcement. See Jose L. Siqueiros, Enforcement of
Foreign Civil and Commercial Judgments in the Mexican Republic, 1986 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMPo
L. 149, 154-55 (noting that foreign judgments may be recognized solely for preclusion
purposes under Mexican law without a showing of reciprocity). The relevant section of
the Mexican Code is Capitulo VI, C.P.C.D.F. art. 605 (Mex. 1989).
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quite sanguine about its potential. "All these problems," said
one commentator, "could be eliminated through the enactment
... of ... the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition
Act."155 Of course this was the view before local introduction of
the discretionary reciprocity requirement. 156 Concerns about
due process were focused solely on due process in the foreign
proceeding} 57
The earlier cases under the Texas International Act offer no
surprises. In Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. 158 and Norkan Lodge Co. v.
Gillum, 159 two federal district courts applying Texas law gave conclusive effect to the respective judgments of English and Canadian courts.
In Hunt, the plaintiff brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that a prior, adverse English judgment was unenforceable
because under Texas law absence of reciprocity was a discretionary ground for nonrecognition, and England allegedly did not
recognize judgments ofD.S. courts}60 The court cited the Texas
International Act as setting forth the elements necessary for a
party to establish a prima facie case for recognition of foreign
country judgments in Texas. 161 Applying Texas law, it also
noted that the burden of proof to establish lack of reciprocity was
on the party opposing such recognition. 162 The court concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the prima facie case presented
by the defendant and had failed to show nonreciprocity,163 and
therefore the English judgment was enforceable. l64
In the same year, the court in Norkan Lodge was asked to determine whether the bases for nonrecognition under the Texas
155. Carl, supra note 101, at 687; see Beverly M. Carl, Unifonn Foreign Country Money
judgments Recognition Act, 44 TEX. BJ. 60, 60 (1981) (stating that the "situations can be
easily remedied through the enactment by Texas of the Uniform Foreign Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act").
156. See, e.g., Carl, supra note 101, at 697 (stating that "the Act contains no reciprocity requirement").
157. Id. at 691-92, 696-98.
158. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. [Hunt II], 580 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Tex. 1984). Hunt
II involved the same parties and issues as its predecessor, Hunt I, 492 F. Supp. 885
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
159. Norkan Lodge Co. v. Gillum, 587 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Tex. 1984). This case
and Hunt II are discussed in D. Paul Dalton et aI., Annual Suroey of Texas Law-ConJlict of
Laws, 39 SW. LJ. 373, 387 (1985).
160. Hunt II, 580 F. Supp. at 305-06.
161. !d. at 307 & nn.6-7 (citing § 5(a) and (b) of the Texas International Act).
162. !d. at 307-08.
163. Id. at 309.
164. Id.
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International Act precluded enforcement of a Canadian judgment. 165 Although the factual situation differed from Hunt, the
Norkan Lodge court found ample bases for enforcing the Canadian
judgment. In Hunt, the action involved a dispute over a debt,166
whereas the Norkan Lodge case arose out of an alleged trespass
and conversion. 167 The court held that the defendant had failed
to establish any of his affirmative defenses of nonreciprocity,
fraud, and repugnance to public policy. 168
In Allen v. Tennant,169 however, the foreign judgment at issue
was denied enforcement by a Texas state court. The plaintiffs
instituted a writ of mandamus proceeding against a state trial
court judge to set aside an order enforcing a foreign country
default judgment entered against them. 170 The appellate court
held that the trial court judge was without authority to enforce
the judgment because the judgment creditor had failed to meet
the requirements of the Texas International Act, as implemented
by the Texas version of the 1964 Interstate Act.'7 1 In order to
obtain enforcement of a foreign judgment, the judgment creditor
first had to file an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment
with the clerk of any Texas court of competent jurisdiction. 172
Second, the filing had to be accompanied by an affidavit indicating the names and last known addresses of both parties. 173
Lastly, the clerk had to give notice of the filing to the debtor. 174
The court concluded that because the judgment creditor had
failed to give notice of the filing of the judgment or, in the alternative, notice of filing of a new cause of action, all orders pertaining to the enforcement were to be set aside. 175 The decision is
hardly startling. But those that followed were indeed so.
V.

HENNESSY, DETAMORE, AND DIAMOND PLASTICS

Contrary to a general understanding that had inspired the Uni165. Norhan Lodge, 587 F. Supp. at 1459.
166. See Hunt I, 492 F. Supp. at 888-90.
167. See Norhan Lodge, 587 F. Supp. at 1458.
168. Id. at 1460-62 (noting that while the Texas International Act disfavors "recognition ofjudgments from countries not reciprocally recognizing Texas judgments, ... [it]
leaves the Court some discretion in this area").
169. Allen v. Tennant, 678 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
170. Id. at 743.
171. [d. at 744.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 744-45.
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form International Act and had been reinforced by more than
twenty years of experience with it, three different intermediate
appellate courts in Texas determined that the "model" legislation was not so model after all. Indeed, it was found to be so
seriously deficient that in one case the Act was effectively rewritten by the court, while in the other two cases the statute was
declared unconstitutional. The possibility of these results had
been briefly acknowledged in scholarly writings but summarily
dismissed. 176
The first case in this trilogy was Hennessy v. Marshall. 177 The
primary question was whether, absent a plenary hearing, an Englishjudgment could be recognized under the Texas International
Act and then enforced under the Texas version of the 1964 Interstate Act. 178 The trial court held that "these two Acts had been
satisfied and that the English judgment was valid and enforceable
in the same manner as a judgment of the State of Texas, just as
though the English judgment was that of a sister state."179 On
the basis of this holding, the trial court entered an order
directing appellants to provide post-judgment discovery.I 8o
Appellants then sought a writ of mandamus requiring the judge
to vacate the post-judgment discovery order.I 81
In vacating the trial court's order, the appellate court reasoned
that "the question of enforcement is not material until the foreign country judgment has first been recognized. "182 It added
that the criteria for nonrecognition could be established only in a
176. See, e.g., Charles W. Joiner, The Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments by
American Courts, 34 AM. J. COMPo L. 193, 222 & n.165 (Supp. 1986) (criticizing some
courts' rejection of a registration procedure for enforcement as running counter to both
the wording and the intent of the Uniform International Act). But if. Bishop, supra note
88, at 288 (noting that both the language and intent of the Texas International Act
permit enforcement through Texas' version of the 1964 Interstate Act); Bishop & Burnette, supra note 98, at 428 (stating that the drafters' intent was to permit registration of
foreign nation judgments under the interstate acts). The acknowledgement is only
implicit since no mention is made of unconstitutionality. Rejection of registration for
enforcement under the 1964 Interstate Act, however, means that no notice and hearing
procedures are available for foreign country judgments unless a new suit is brought on
the original judgment.
177. Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). The case is discussed in James P. George & Fred C. Pedersen, Annual Survey of Texas Law-ConJlict of
Laws, 40 SW. LJ. 401, 448-49 (1986).
178. Henmssy, 682 S.W.2d at 342.
179. [d.
180. /d.
181. [d.
182. [d. at 343.
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plenary hearing. 183
With respect to the standards for determining the propriety of
the foreign court's personal jurisdiction,184 the court also concluded that "these matters cannot be determined absent a plenary hearing on the question of recognition."185 Because of
these concerns, and the absence of any statutory guidance on the
question of what proceedings to use for testing the foreign
court's jurisdiction, 186 the court inferred that "the drafters of the
Uniform Act and the Texas legislature intended that a plenary
hearing be had before the foreign country judgment is recognized
and before enforcement of the foreign country judgment commences."187 Relying in part on other "sister-state decisions
which have considered the question before US,"188 the appellate
court held that "a plenary s~it must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas Court before a foreign country judgment is
entitled to recognition and enforcement." 189
Three years after Hennessy, a second appellate court was faced
with a similar issue of interpretation of the Texas International
Act. In Detamore v. Sullivan,190 a Canadian court had granted a
default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Continental Bank of
Canada, against the Texas defendant, Detamore. 191 Subsequently, Continental Bank filed the default judgment in an applicable Texas county clerk's office seeking a writ of execution. 192
The trial judge ordered the sale of defendant's stock under the
183. [d. at 343-44. The court emphasized that:
these criteria for nonrecognition can be established only in a plenary hearing
by the judgment holder against the judgment debtor. Absent such a plenary
hearing, the defendant has not had an opportunity to present the matters set
forth in section 5 [of the Texas International Act], some of which are in the
nature of affirmative defenses and some of which the party seeking recognition
of the foreign country judgment must affirmatively establish.
[d. at 344.
184. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.006 (West 1986).
185. Hennessy, 682 S.W.2d at 344.
186. See supra text accompanying note 123.
187. Hennessy, 682 S.W.2d at 345.
188. [d. The cases relied on by the court were Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 397
N.E.2d 101 (III. App. Ct. 1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 360 N.E.2d 386 (III. App. Ct.
1977); Hager v. Hager, 274 N.E.2d 157 (III. App. Ct. 1971); Biel v. Boehm, 406
N.Y.S.2d 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
189. Hennessy, 682 S.W.2d at 345.
190. Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The case is discussed in Sharon N. Freytag et aI., Annual Suroey of Texas Law-ConJlict of Laws, 42 Sw. L.J.
455, 495-96 (1988).
191. Detamore, 731 S.W.2d at 123.
192. [d.

766

Ceo. Wash. J. Int'} L. & Econ.

[Vol. 25

writ to satisfy thejudgment.I 93 As in Hennessy, the defendant filed
an application for a writ of mandamus requiring the trial judge to
vacate his order.I 94
Defendant Detamore advanced two contentions in support of
his application. First, he claimed that the foreign judgment had
not been properly recognized as a Texas judgment because he
was not afforded the plenary hearing that he was entitled to
under Hennessy.I 95 In the alternative, Detamore argued that the
Texas International Act was facially unconstitutional because it
failed to provide the judgment debtor with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of recognition. 196
With respect to the first contention, although the Detamore
court agreed with the rationale of Hennessy, 197 it concluded that
the Hennessy court had gone too far in ordering a plenary hearing
because the Act did not provide for one. The court therefore
expressly declined to follow that court's holding. 198 On the constitutional issue, however, the court reasoned that since the
grounds for nonrecognition are affirmative defenses,199 "a judgment debtor could find himself in the procedural quandary of
having a valid defense to recognition and enforcement of a foreign country judgment but being unable to assert that
defense. "200 The court regarded this as a denial of the judgment
debtor's due process rights and concluded that the Texas International Act was unconstitutional. 201
In 1989, confronted with an attempt to enforce a Barbados
judgment, a third appellate court in Plastics Engineering Inc. v. Dia193. [d.
194. [d.
195. [d.
196. [d. For a discussion of facial unconstitutionality, see supra note 18.
197. Id.
198. [d. Justice Cannon stated that incorporating procedures where none are provided for by statute constituted judicial legislating and, as a result, declined to follow
Hennessy's mandate of a plenary hearing. [d.
199. [d. at 124. The grounds for nonrecognition are set forth in the Texas International Act. TEX. Ctv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005 (West 1986). Recall that the
court in Hunt II, in interpreting the nonrecognition provision, stated that the burden of
proof was on the party opposing the recognition of the judgment. Hunt II, 580 F. Supp.
304,307-08 (N.D. Tex. 1984); see also supra text accompanying note 162.
200. Detamore, 731 S.W.2d at 124.
20 I. [d. One of the authors of this Article inspected the entire record on appeal in
Detamore as well as the briefs on appeal filed by relator and respondent. The judgment
creditor made no attempt to argue that a foreign country judgment could be registered
under the 1964 Interstate Act.
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mond Plastics COrp.202 chose Detamore over Hennessy 203: the Uniform International Act was unconstitutional for not providing a
plenary hearing to determine the eligibility of the foreign country
judgment for recognition. 204 The judgment creditor had
advanced the argument that the Barbados judgment in question
could be scrutinized at the time of enforcement proceedings, but
the court insisted that recognition preceded enforcement and that
"recognition being conclusive ... could not be relitigated in the
enforcement proceeding."205
The situation seemed to call for legislative remedy. But first
we examine the constitutional issues in greater detail.
VI.
A.

THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT

Application to Foreign Judgments

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution prohibit governmental action that deprives "any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. "206 The
essential ingredient of due process is fairness. 207 This requires a
neutral and detached decisionmaker. 208 It also requires notice
and usually a hearing prior to any grievous governmental deprivation. 209 In some situations, a post-deprivation hearing or other
process will suffice. 210
202. Plastics Eng'g Inc. v. Diamond Plastics Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989).
203. Compare supra text accompanying notes 177-189 (mandating a plenary hearing
for deciding questions of recognition) with supra text accompanying notes 190-20 I
(declining to require a plenary hearing but finding the Texas International Act facially
unconstitutional) .
204. Diamond Plastics, 764 S.W.2d at 927 (holding that "to engraft procedures for a
plenary hearing on the Recognition Act, where none is provided, constitutes impermissible judicial legislating").
205. Id. at 926.
206. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. Procedural due process analysis is not implicated unless the government attempts to deprive an individual of a constitutionally protected
"life, liberty, or property" interest. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569
(1972).
207. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
§ 17.8 (2d ed. 1992); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
208. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 207, § 17.8; see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254,271 (1970).
209. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 10-8, -14, -15
(2d ed. 1988); see, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 31415 (1950); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930); Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
210. TRIBE, supra note 209, § 10-14; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 207, § 17.8. Due
process generally requires that an individual be afforded a hearing prior to any depriva-
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Due process requires notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing only one time, however, and not a succession of times. 211
Applied to the enforcement of sister state judgments, this means
that
[d]ue process need not be satisfied separately in each state that
has anything to do with enforcement of a judgment. It is
enough that one process be satisfied in one state. After that
the action ofa second state in enforcing the already validjudgment is essentially administrative in character, with no new
service and hearing necessary. 212
The proposition is now beyond cavil. The U.S. Supreme Court,
"for want of substantial federal question," has dismissed an
appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado that
upheld, against due process objections, enforcement of a New
Mexico money judgment in Colorado under the Uniform Interstate Act. 213 This accords with almost universal academic
analysis. 214
tion of an interest that is protected under the Due Process Clause. See Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). In some cases, however, it may be constitutionally permissible to postpone the hearing until after the deprivation has occurred. See, e.g., Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (permitting a post-deprivation hearing). The Court has
made it clear that post-deprivation hearings may only take place in "extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the evenl." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). The
classic type of case where a post-deprivation hearing will be allowed is one involving
exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594,
599-600 (1950) (rejecting a due process timing challenge to § 304(a) of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which allowed seizures of misbranded articles, even if
there was no threat to the public health); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 437
(1944) (upholding emergency wartime price controls without a prior hearing due to exigent circumstances); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306,
315 (1908) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law which allowed for the destruction, after an inspection but prior to a hearing, of food believed to have spoiled on the
grounds of public safety).
211. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 235; see, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 240
(1946).
212. LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 235-36.
213. Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 583 (Colo.) (stating that "[t]he basic requirements of notice and hearing have been met by the New Mexico court which rendered the
original judgment"), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1050 (1981). The constitutionality of the
Uniform Interstate Act has been upheld against due process challenges in Holley v. Holley, 568 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ark. 1978) (en banc); Bittner v. BullS, 514 S.W.2d 556, 559
(Mo. 1974); Hehr v. Tucker, 472 P.2d 797, 799 (Or. 1970) (en banc); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 97 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Neb. 1959): Glotzer v. Glotzer, 447 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y.
Sup. Cl. 1982). See generally Sara L. Johnson, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act, 31 A.L.R.4TH 706, 715-17 (1984).
214. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 7, §§ 93, 100; LEFLAR ET AL.,
supra note 32, at 235-36; Chappell & Feeney, supra note 44, at 490; Leflar, supra note 40,
at 347. Contra David W. Hartmann, Enforcing Foreign Judgments: Due Process Considerations.
46 J. Mo. B. 529, 536 (1 !l90) (stating that the failure to provide for notice and an oppor-
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The constitutional context changes, and from a structural
standpoint it changes rather dramatically, when the recognition
or enforcement sought in the forum is for a foreign country judgment. True, comity in practice may come dose to full faith and
credit. 215 But the due process ingredients are different. It can no
longer be assumed that the original judgment passes muster for
having been rendered in ajurisdiction subject to the U.S. Constitution. There is no appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court from a
foreign country court. 216 Satisfaction of due process standards
for U.S. constitutional purposes is therefore in suspense. Satisfaction remains to be established, either in fact or by presumption. Automatic, unquestioning acceptance of a foreign country
judgment falls short of U.S. due process standards for actual
implementation at the forum. A new suit on the judgment may
cure that shortfall. Mere registration may not. 217
B.

Silence of the Uniform International Act

Remarkable and even incredible as it may seem, the authors of
the Uniform International Act focused exclusively on fairness in
the foreign forum. 218 They gave no thought to how this might be
established in the enforcing forum. They apparently assumed
nothing further was needed than fairness in the rendering court
and established no procedure by which this key issue might be
determined. The record of the Commissioners' deliberations
bears not a trace of concern for the problem that so preoccupied
the drafters of the two Uniform Interstate Acts: what notice and
IUnily to be heard in the post-judgment context amounts to a "due process violation that
is being systematically ignored as a matter of public policy"); see James P. George & Fred
C. Pedersen, Annual Suroey of Texas Law-Conjiict of Law, 41 SW. LJ. 383, 427-29 (1987)
(stating that Texas' version of the 1964 Interstate Act needs to be amended to include
specific due process remedies).
215. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, §§ 481, 482; see also
supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
216. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, § 481 cmt. a.
217. In Hilton, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that "we are not prepared to hold
that the fact that the procedure in these respects differed from that of our own courts is,
of itself, a sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign judgment. " Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113,205 (1895). The "differing procedures" involved were the French practices of
permitting the plaintiff to testify without being under oath, not subjecting the plaintiff to
cross-examination by the defendant, and the introduction of evidence that would not be
admissible in a U.S. court. [d. at 204-05.
218. The drafters were Professors Kurt H. Nadelmann and Willis L.M. Reese. See
1961 Proceedings, supra note 120, at 1. Indicative of Professor Nadelmann's focus is his
statement that "[t]he British Act does not include a due process requirement. Our draft
does. I think it would seem obvious that no legislation should be enacted without a due
process requirement." !d. at 8-9.
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hearing procedures are required by due process for recognition
in the "second" forum?219
The explanation for so egregious an oversight is not immediately apparent. Certainly the drafters and the Commissioners did
not expect a court to interpolate appropriate notice and hearing
procedures, as was done in Hennessy.220 Detamore and Diamond
Plastics quite properly rejected so extreme an example ofjudicial
creativity.22 1 The essence of procedural due process resides in
the mechanics, a matter singularly unsuitable for gap-filling without guidance. What mechanics there are in the Uniform International Act were considered in quite specific detail.222 This is
hardly consistent with an intent to leave due process mechanics
to the uncertainties of judicial improvisation.
What, then, is the explanation for the oversight? It will be
recalled that the Uniform International Act of 1962 followed the
Interstate Act of 1948 but preceded its revision in the Interstate
Act of 1964. 223 In 1962, therefore, enforcement of a foreign country judgment would have been accomplished either by a new suit
on the original judgment or by a judicially supervised summary
process under the 1948 Act. 224 In either case, the judgment
debtor would have enjoyed the right to notice and the right to be
heard on the issue offoreign country fairness, all in the same fashion as he could have raised certain limited objections, such as
lack ofjurisdiction, to enforcement of a sister state judgment. 225
Due process in this country for establishing the existence of due
process in the foreign country, under the Uniform International
Act, would simply take place under the 1948 Interstate Act.
The difficulty with this explanation, however, is that both the
219. Concerns about the two Uniform Interstate Acts are set forth supra text accompanying notes 45-72. Hearings on the Uniform International Act included a section by
section analysis. taking up 79 double-spaced. typed pages. No cognizance is taken of the
problems considered in this Article. See 1961 Proceedings, supra note 120, at 1-39; Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Proceedings in Committee of the
Whole 1-40 (July 31, 1962) (unpublished transcript, on file with The George Washington
Journal of International Law and Economics) [hereinafter 1962 Proceedings). In section 3,
providing for enforcement of a foreign country money judgment in the same manner as
a sister state judgment. the transcript records that when the chairman asked for discussion, "[There was none.]." Id. at 14.
220. See supra notes 177-189 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
222. The drafters were careful to perform a section by section analysis. See 1962
Proceedings. supra note 219, at 7-39.
223. See supra text accompanying note 119.
224. See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
225. See LEFl.AR ET AL., supra note 32, at 236; Paulsen. supra note 34, at 204.
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1948 Act and the 1964 Act define "foreign judgment" as one
already "entitled to full faith and credit."226 That of course
excludes foreign country judgments.227 Can they nevertheless be
included through cross-reference from the Uniform International
Act? It prescribes enforcement of foreign country judgments "in
the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit. "228 But what enjoys this in-the-samemanner treatment is a foreign country judgment that is already
"conclusive" for having met the criteria for recognition. 229 The
exact wording of the cross-reference bears repetition in context:
Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment meeting
the requirements of section 2 is conclusive between the parties
to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of
money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same
manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit. 230

Section 4 specifies grounds for nonrecognition.23I Section 2
requires that a foreign country judgment be final and conclusive
and enforceable where rendered. 232 Only a foreign country
judgment meeting those requirements is enforceable "in the
same manner" as a sister state judgment. 233 There is nothing to
remit until the foreign country judgment qualifies for
recognition.
The cross-reference thus fails to span the definitional gap. It is
like that ravaged medieval bridge on the Rhone at Avignon,
anchored to an abutment at one end but truncated in space at the
other. 234 Still barred in limine is any consideration of those issues
226. 1948 INTERSTATE ACT, supra note 45, § I(a), 13 V.L.A. at 183; 1964 INTERSTATE
ACT, supra note 63, § I, 13 V.L.A. at 152.
227. As indicated earlier, foreign country judgments are not covered by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. V.S. CONST. art. IV, § I; see also supra note
73 and accompanying text. The cases routinely cited for this proposition are Dayan v.
McDonald's Corp., 397 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 360
N.E.2d 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Hager v. Hager, 274 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971);
Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). These cases are cited in Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
228. VNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8, § 3, 13 V.L.A. at 265.
229. Id. §§ 2, 3, 13 V.L.A. at 264-65.
230. Id. § 3, 13 V.L.A. at 265.
231. Id. § 4, 13 V.L.A. at 268.
232. Id. § 2, 13 V.L.A. at 264.
233. Id. § 3, 13 V.L.A. at 265.
234. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Bridges, Construction and History of, (15th ed. 1982)
(asserting that partial destruction of Pont d'Avignon was due to war and to ice in the
river); MICHELIN TOURIST GUIDE, Provence, S.V. Avignon (3d ed. 1985) (map, history of
"St. Benezet's Bridge," and etching of the same).
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required by the Uniform International Act to be resolved in favor
of recognition and enforcement. 235 This in fact was so declared
by the cases cited in Hennessy.236
Even if the definitional threshold could be crossed, however,
the terms of the 1964 Act, with its simple registration procedure,237 would leave the judgment debtor with considerably less
remedy than that available when the Uniform International Act
was issued in 1962. In addition, there is no evidence that the
Commissioners in 1962 ever contemplated the possibility of
applying simple registration procedures in the enforcement of
foreign country judgments. 238
As to recognition, as distinguished from enforcement, it is perhaps possible that the drafters of the Uniform International Act
expected the matter to arise, and be dealt with in accordance with
applicable due process standards, in a main proceeding to which
the issue of recognition was incidental. 239 At least such a concept
would not confront the threshold barrier of exclusion by definition. But rationalizing the omission of recognition procedures
still leaves open the problem of enforcement.
There is a final possibility. To invoke the vernacular, nobody's
perfect. If the Uniform Commercial Code, with its impressive
genealogy and long period of closely monitored gestation, can
contain manifest errors of draftsmanship, so too can other uniform acts. 240 An explanation for the oversight, then, may be that
the sponsors simply never thought of the problem. In their zeal
235. A recent commentator rejects this conclusion, albeit without analysis. Brand,
supra note 83, at 278-79 (stating that the Uniform International Act "effectively incorporates" the Uniform Interstate Act into its terms in those states that have adopted both);
see ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. supra note 103, at 21 (declaring that the Uniform
International Act "incorporates" the Uniform Interstate Act into its terms where the
latter is in effect). The short answer to an "incorporates" position is two-fold: (1) the
text of neither one even purports to incorporate the other; and (2) the cross-reference
fails to accomplish an effect equivalent to incorporation because of the ellipsis between
foreign country judgment and "conclusive" foreign country judgment. The truncated
end of the bridge is on the international side.
236. See cases cited supra note 227.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
238. Homburger. supra note 53, at 399 n.175; see also supra notes 123. 219 and accompanying text.
239. The possibility is suggested in dictum by the Zalduendo court. See Zalduendo v.
Zalduendo, 360 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
240. See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 6-7 (3d ed. 1988) (the interplay among §§ 2-610, 2-711, 2-712, 2-713, and 2-723 is
an "impossible legal thicket"). The fullest judicial discussion of this problem with the
UCC is found in Cosden Oil v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064, 1069-73
(5th Cir. 1984).
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to ensure due process abroad, they ignored due process at
home. 241
In this they were not alone. In none of the literature on the
subject is the problem addressed, although unwittingly some
writers come close. 242 Advocates of equal treatment for foreign
country judgments and sister state judgments have always
assumed that foreign country judgments would be subject to
scrutiny in this country for 'jurisdictional" requirements such as
adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard. 243 But they
have never considered what this scrutiny might entail and how a
judgment debtor might trigger it. Those issues are the subject of
the next section. What "process" is "due" in the recognizing or
enforcing forum?

C.

The Balancing Test

For present purposes, it will be taken as given that most foreign countries provide litigants with fair and reasonable judicial
procedures, and that the fundamental policy of terminating litigation after a final judgment has been rendered entitles foreign
country judgments to recognition in the United States. 244 There
241. This may be the case, for instance, with Professor Nadelmann, a co-author of
the Uniform International Act. Apparently, he regarded as exemplary the regime that
obtained in California from 1907 to 1974,.under which a foreign country judgment
enjoyed even higher status than ajudgment of a sister state. See infra text accompanying
notes 311-331.
It is possible that the statement in the text is too harsh. One commentator attributes
the hiatus to an "implicit assumption." William C. Sturm, Enforcement oj Foreign Judgments, 95 COM. LJ. 200, 215 (1990) (noting that there was an implicit assumption by the
sponsors that enforcement would be available through the 1948 Interstate Act). An
example of this latter-day oversight, in an otherwise excellent summary of U.S. practice,
is Leigh B. Middleditch, Jr. et aI., Enforcement oj Foreign Commercial Judgments in the U.S.,
England and South Africa, 19 INT'L Bus. LAw. 436, 437 (1991) (noting that when both the
Uniform International Act and the 1964 Interstate Act are in force, "foreign country
judgments may be enforced simply by filing an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment with a state court in the receiving jurisdiction").
242. Homburger, supra note 53, at 397 (stating that absent a treaty, "judicial supervision of validation proceedings and a hearing before final enforcement is preferable for
judgments coming from independent nations of different political, social and legal background") (emphasis added).
243. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 37, at 1003; Scoles, supra note 30, at 1606 &
n.32; see generally David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards
in the United States, West Germany, and England, 19 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 325, 333-36
(1987) (stating that U.S. courts should enforce foreign country judgments unless the
judgment debtor can show that the judgment was obtained by unfair means).
244. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 37, at 1003.
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will be exceptional cases where this is not so, however. 245 Thus a
determination of which cases qualify for recognition and which
cases do not so qualify is itself a part of the process for deprivation of property that must be "due." It is here that the Uniform
International Act breaks down.
Other than the three Texas cases discussed earlier,246 there are
no cases on what process is due in the determination of whether
or not due process has been obtained in the foreign country rendering court. 247 Nor is there more than one authority, Gedeon v.
Gedeon, addressing that problem with respect to a sister state
judgment. 248 One must therefore rely on analogy and
extrapolation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not provided systematic guidance
on the values and objectives of the due process determination. 249
The answers have depended heavily on the particular context
involved. 250 In all cases today, however, the Court employs a
three-pronged balancing test. As elaborated in Mathews v.
Eldridge,251 the factors to be weighed are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 252
245. See Ebke & Parker, supra note 53, at 35 (noting that foreign country judgments
have rarely been denied recognition due to a lack of fair procedures).
246. See supra notes 177-205 and accompanying text.
247. The Uniform International Act's specific jurisdictional requirements appear to
be higher than those applicable under modern long-arm statutes, but § 5(b) permits
acceptance of other bases of jurisdiction in the rendering court. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8. § 5(b), 13 U.L.A. at 272; see also Bank of Montreal v. Kough,
612 F.2d 467, 469-71 (9th Cir. 1980) (interpreting California's International Act to permit enforcement of a British Columbia judgment with jurisdiction based on the state
long-arm statute).
248. Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 583 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1050
(1981); see supra text accompanying note 213.
249. Two esteemed constitutional law scholars have labeled the Court's approach to
procedural due process analysis as utilitarian. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 207,
§ 17.8.
250. [d.
251. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
252. /d. at 335. The test was actually adopted by the Court two years earlier in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See infra text accompanying note 277.
The most recent Supreme Court case on the subject is significantly different, factually
and legally, from the scenario typically involved in the foreign judgment situation with
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All federal and state courts in the United States must now follow
the Mathews balancing test. 253 It is employed not only to determine if an individual is entitled to a hearing, whether before or
after deprivation, but also to determine the precise procedures to
be employed, with or without a hearing. 254 The threshold
requirement is of course that the individual's interest be constitutionally protected against deprivation without "due process of
law."255
In creditor-debtor type cases, it is doctrine that when the creditor invokes government-enforced procedures to take property of
the debtor or alleged debtor, the latter is deprived of a constitutionally significant interest in property.256 Once the creditor has
established his claim, however, the debtor has been accorded due
process and the government may help the creditor to enforce
it. 257 Even here, however, a minimum of procedure may be
required to satisfy due process. An examination of how the U.S.
which we are here concerned. Connecticut v. Doehr, III S. Ct. 2105 (1991), involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute allowing prejudgment attachment of
defendant's property without notice or hearing. [d. at 2109. The statute in question
required only an oath by the plaintiff that there was probable cause to sustain the validity
of his or her claim. [d. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision that
the statute violated due process because it permitted ex parte attachment absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances. [d. at 2116. In the course of its opinion, the
Supreme Court shifted the focus of the third prong of the Mathews test-the governmental interest. Mathews involved the question of "what process is due when the government itself seeks to effect a deprivation on its own initiative." /d. at 2112. In Doehr, the
Court paid "principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment
remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may
have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater
protections." [d.
With respect to this alteration of the third prong, foreign judgments are probably
more similar to Doehr than Mathews. But Doehr involved a civil suit for assault and battery, and the Court emphasized the importance of "the highly factual nature of the
issues," as contrasted with "uncomplicated matters that len[t] themselves to documentary
proof" /d. at 2111 (emphasis added) (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
609 (1974)). In this more important regard, cases involving foreign money judgments
are more like Mathews.
253. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 207, § 17.8. For a criticism of the Mathews balancing test, see TRIBE, supra note 209, § 10-13 (stating that "protection of such 'core'
concerns cannot be afforded by 'balancing' the general interests of the majority against
those of the individual"); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46 (1976) (commenting that the Mathews test is "incomplete" and that the Court has overlooked alternative theories such as individual dignity,
equality, and tradition).
254. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 207, § 17.8.
255. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
256. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 207, § 17.9(b).
257. [d.
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Supreme Court has dealt with post-judgment garnishment procedures will give some indication of how it might deal with the
analogous problem of enforcing or recognizing foreign country
judgments. Prejudgment garnishment procedures will be considered as well, since presumably the Court would turn to them for
guidance. 258
As early as 1924, the U.S. Supreme Court held in EndicottJohnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc. that due process does not
require post-judgment garnishment procedures to provide a
debtor with notice or hearing before garnishment. 259 The Court
reasoned that the underlying proceeding served as constructive
notice to the debtor that the creditor might attempt to garnish
the debtor's wages to satisfy the judgment. 26o The Court added
that "in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential
that he [the debtor] be given notice before the issuance of an
execution against his tangible property; after the rendition of the
judgment he must take 'notice of what will follow,' no further
notice being 'necessary to advance justice.' "261
For more than five decades, the EndicottJohnson rule was largely
followed by the lower courts. 262 Then in 1980 in Finberg v. Sulli258. Darrell W. Dunham, Postjudgment Seizures: Does Due Process Require Notice and
Hearing?, 21 S.D. L. REV. 78, 79 (1976).
259. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).
260. Id. at 288-89.
261. Id. at 288.
262. See, e.g., McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 593 F. Supp. 319, 326-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 774 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1985); Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825
(1969); South Florida Trust Co. v. Miami Coliseum Corp., 133 So. 334 (Fla. 1931).
One exception to the Endicott Johnson rule emerged in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220
(1946), involving garnishment for alimony arrearages to satisfy a judgment. The majority opinion made no mention of Endicott Johnson, and the Court required that the debtor
be afforded notice and a hearing. Id. at 235. Other domestic relations cases have consistently followed Griffin, and Endicott Johnson is still followed in most other cases. See
Dunham, supra note 258, at 81 & n.16.
A second exception to the Endicott Johnson rule, not involving a domestic relations
matter, is Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Haw. 1977). In Betts, the lessor, holding a
default judgment, seized the lessee's bank account that contained only unexpended
funds from a welfare grant. Id. at 1370-71. Under Hawaiian law, such funds are exempt
from execution. Id. at 1371 & n.3. The court ruled that the judgment creditor should
have been required at least to submit prior to seizure an affidavit that the funds were not
exempt, followed by an immediate hearing on the issue of exemption within two days.
Id. at 1377-78.
For an interesting proposal suggesting a post-judgment summary-seizure procedure
designed to protect the interests of both debtors and creditors, see Thomas W. Logue,
Comment, Due Process, Postjudgment Garnishment, and "Brutal Need" Exemptions, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 192.
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional for failing to provide
immediate post-seizure adjudication of claims of exemption 264
and for failing to require that the debtor be informed of the existence of the exemptions. 265 Nevertheless, on closer examination,
Finberg is consistent with Endicott Johnson. First, the particular
facts of Finberg were critical to the court's decision: Mrs. Finberg
was a sixty-eight year old widow on welfare. 266 Second, federal
law proscribes the seizure of Social Security benefits. 267 Third,
Pennsylvania law provides a $300 cash exemption to debtors in
Mrs. Finberg's economic position. 268 The real issue, therefore,
was whether Pennsylvania law adequately protected Mrs.
Finberg's statutory right to exempt certain property from
seizure. 269 Because the protection of an unadjudicated statutory
right was involved, the requirement of additional safeguards can
be reconciled with Endicott Johnson. 270
The Finberg decision was preceded, and perhaps facilitated, by
the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier holding in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.. 271 The Sniadach Court held that, because garnishment of wages is such a severe deprivation and the possibility for
grave injustice is so manifest, due process requires that it be preceded by notice to the debtor and an opportunity for a hearing. 272 This holding, in a prejudgment attachment case, rested
entirely on the Court's characterization of wages as a type of
property unique in our economic system. 2n Following Sniadach,
the Court held in Fuentes v. Shevin 274 that a replevin statute violated due process because it failed to provide the debtor with
notice and an opportunity to dispute the creditor's claim of
van,26g

263. Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane).
264. /d. at 61.
265. [d. at 62.
266. ld. at 51.
267. [d. at 52 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1988».
268. /d. (discussing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (1979». In 1991, the state legislature reduced the exemption to $100. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (1991).
269. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 56.
270. This distinction is further developed in Michael M. Greenfield, A Constitutional
Limitation on the Enforcement ofJudgments-Due Process and Exemptions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q
877, 896-98 (advocating that the Endicott Johnson rule should not apply when new questions of law or fact relevant to subsequent proceedings could not have been litigated in
the earlier proceeding).
271. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
272. [d. at 340-42.
273. [d. at 340.
274. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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default. 275 Fuentes is significant, not for its holding but for its dissent. The "balancing of interests" approach advocated in the
dissent 276 was adopted as the majority's opinion in Mitchell v.
W T. Grant CO.277 This approach, as noted earlier, represents the
Court's current position on due process. 278 The Mitchell Court
deemed it critically important that a judge was involved in the
process to assure that the debtor was not left to the
"unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries. "279
Mitchell also reflects a shared understanding among the concurring and dissenting justices that the pro-debtor opinion in Fuentes
had been overruled. 280
Mitchell's "shared understanding" was somewhat muddled,
however, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 281 In North
Georgia, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional a Georgia statute that allowed the creditor to garnish the property of an
alleged debtor under certain procedural safeguards but without a
hearing prior to the garnishment or attachment of the debtor's
assets. 282
Of the foregoing cases, only Finberg involved post-judgment
garnishment. It concerned the issue of exempt property and
ruled for the debtor. 283 Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia all involved prejudgment garnishment. Mitchell, contemplating some judicial intervention, ruled for the creditor. But
Sniadach, concerning wages; Fuentes, concerning consumer goods;
and North Georgia, contemplating no judicial intervention, all
ruled for the debtor. Can these various holdings be reconciled?
To what extent are they applicable by analogy or otherwise to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments?
275.
276.

/d. at 67-68.

[d. at 99-102 (White, j., dissenting). Justice White reasoned that the seller's
interest in the property, to prevent deterioration of his or her security, was greater than
the property owner's interest in retaining the use of the property pending final judgment. [d. at 100.
277. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
278. Mitchell was articulated further and eventually formalized in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying text.
279. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 616.
280. /d. at 623 (Powell, j., concurring) ("1 think it is fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled."); id. at 634 (Stewart, j., dissenting) (asserting that "this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin, and the Court today has simply
rejected the reasoning of that case and adopted instead the analysis of the Fuentes
dissent") .
281. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
282. /d. at 606-07.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 263-270.
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It should be borne in mind that the Texas appellate courts did
not strike down the procedures of the Uniform International Act
as constitutionally insufficient. 284 They found them constitutionally nonexistent, except, in the case of Hennessy, by what the other
two courts thought was impermissible judicial legislation. 285 If
the Uniform International Act had operated as its creators apparently thought it would, the procedures to be scrutinized for due
process constitutionality of enforcement would be those of the
1948 Interstate Act and, by extension, those ultimately adopted
in the 1964 Interstate Act. For recognition alone, compliance
would automatically occur whenever res judicata or collateral
estoppel issues arose in already pending litigation. 286
The cumulative effect of the various holdings in Endicott Johnson, Finberg, Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia confirms
the constitutionality of the 1964 Interstate Act procedures, and a
fortiori those of the 1948 Interstate Act. 287 The sine qua non for
satisfying the dictates of due process is that the judgment debtor
have an opportunity to present defenses by motion to set aside
registration at some point before his property is finally taken on
execution. 288 This the 1964 Interstate Act provides. 289 So does
the Texas International Act as amended in 1989, described and
discussed in the following section. 290
The law was aptly summarized as follows by the Colorado
284. See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 182-187.
286. Juenger, supra note 5, at 5 ("To 'recognize' a foreign judgment means to
respect the foreign court's decision as res judicata.").
287. Several attempts have been made to reconcile these and similar cases. The
common theme seems to be this: the Mathews balancing test recognizes both the judgment creditor's interest in expeditious seizure and the judgment debtor's interest in
preventing erroneous deprivation, thus indicating a willingness to permit seizures without prior notice only if such seizure is followed by an immediate post-deprivation hearing. See Dunham, supra note 258, at 92-93, 104; Logue, supra note 262, at 206-07.
288. See, e.g., LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 32, at 235 (noting that the judgment debtor is
"amply protected" if he can present defenses any time before execution); Chappell &
Feeney, supra note 44, at 490-91 (stating that enforcement is constitutional so long as
the judgment debtor has an opportunity to present defenses at the time of levy of execution); Gregory A. Harrison, Note, S. 23: Ohio Enacts an Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Law, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 391, 396-98 (1984) (noting that in Ohio notice as well as an
automatic thirty-day stay and early access to a hearing meet the constitutional
requirements).
289. 1964 INTERSTATE ACT, supra note 63, § 3, 13 U.L.A. at 172.
290. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.0044 (West Supp. 1992). For a complete discussion of the Texas amendments, see infra notes 295-310 and accompanying
text.
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Supreme Court in Gedeon v. Gedeon, referred to above 291 :
It is not entirely clear what precisely due process requires by
way of procedures for post-judgment filings such as this.
However, when the creditor's interest in collecting a valid
judgment is balanced against the debtor's interest in keeping
his property, which has already been protected by prior notice
and hearing, in our view, the due process requirements of the
United States Constitution, amend. XIV, are satisfied by the
procedures of the Act. The Act requires that notice be mailed
to the last known address of the debtor and that there be a
ten-day stay of execution. The Act also has liberal provisions
for an additional stay of enforcement of the judgment and for
further hearings. While these procedures may not comply
with the strict requirements of Fuentes, ... those procedures
are not required in post-judgment proceedings. 292

It will be recalled that the appeal from Gedeon was dismissed by
the U.S. Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal
question. 293
We now consider the remedial measures taken by Texas to
cure the supposed unconstitutionality of its Uniform International Act.

VII.

TEXAS AMENDMENTS OF

1989

The response of the international bar in Texas to the Detamore
decision 294 was prompt, organized, and forceful. 295 At the insistance of its international law section, the State Bar of Texas
adopted a draft of proposed amendments to the Texas International Act and included it as part of its legislative agenda for the
1989 session of the legislature. 296 The author of the draft
explained that the purpose was to overrule Detamore and to "aid
See supra text accompanying notes 213, 248.
292. Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 583 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1050
(1981).
293. See supra text accompanying note 213.
294. Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
295. See, e.g., Memorandum from Johnson & Swanson, Enforcing Foreign Judgments in
Texas, Johnson & Swanson Briefing 7, 8 (July 1988) (on file with The George Washington
Journal of International Law and Economics) (explaining that "[t]he law clearly needs urgent
and immediate reform and clarification"). The earlier decision in Hennessy v. Marshall,
682 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App. Ct. 1984), which read a plenary hearing requirement into
the Texas International Act to avoid condemnation of it for violating due process was
largely ignored, probably for two reasons: (1) it represented only one decision, of limited precedential value, from an intermediate appellate court; and (2) it "saved" the
Uniform International Act by reading in a notice and hearing requirement.
296. Frances Rauer, Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act Amendments, 52
TEX. B.]. 39 (1989).
291.
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in renewing the growth of Texas as an international business and
financial center."297 This would be accomplished by making "it
as simple as possible to enforce valid foreign [country] judgments in Texas, ... thereby [assuring] the enforcement of Texas
judgments in foreign countries that condition their recognition
of foreign judgments on reciprocity."298 The State Bar draft also
contained a provision deleting from the Texas International Act
its nonuniform discretionary lack of reciprocity ground for
nonrecognition. 299
The draft, essentially as proposed by the State Bar but without
repeal of the anachronistic reciprocity provision, was passed by
the legislature and became law on June 14, 1989. 300 The commentators concur that the amendments "cure" the constitutional
doubts and that the new provisions simplify substantially the recognition and enforcement in Texas of foreign country
judgments. 301
In summary, the 1989 amendments provide as follows:
1. The party seeking recognition of a foreign country judgment is to file an authenticated copy of the judgment in the judgment debtor's county or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction permitted by Texas venue laws. 302
2. The county clerk is to mail notice of the filing to the party
against whom recognition is sought. 303 As an alternative, the
party seeking recognition may himself mail notice and file proof
of same with the clerk. 304
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Flores & Dubove, supra note 15, at 890 (noting that there was a proposed
amendment that would have repealed § 36.005(b)(7) of the Texas International Act
dealing with reciprocity); NEWSL. INT'L L. SEC. (State Bar of Tex.),Jan. 1989, at 15-16
(containing a copy of the draft legislation, including the proposed repeal in § 2). The
international law section strongly opposed this deletion but dropped its insistence in
contemplation of "a battle for another legislative session." Letter from John P. Cogan,
Jr., Attorney, Baker & Botts, to Sally Velasquez, Legislative Assistant, State Representative Henry Cuellar 1-3 (Mar. 27, 1989) (on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics) (suggesting changes in the draft legislation to accommodate
various objections). For a discussion on the original inclusion of this nonuniform provision in the Texas International Act, see supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
300. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.004-.0044 (West Supp. 1992). The
reciprocity provision remained in tact. /d. § 36.005(b)(7) (West 1986).
30 I. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 121, at II; R. Doak Bishop, Recent Amendments to the
Texas Foreign Country Judgments Act, NEWSL. INT'L L. SEC. (State Bar of Tex.), Jan. 1990, at
17, 19.
302. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.0041 (West Supp. 1992).
303. Id. § 36.0042(b).
304. /d. § 36.0043.
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3. A party against whom recognition is sought may contest
recognition within 30 days after service of notice of filing. This is
extended to 60 days if the party is domiciled in a foreign
country.305
4. Within 20 days following service of the motion for nonrecognition, the party seeking recognition must file its response. 306
Either party may request an evidentiary hearing, which the court
may grant or not at its discretion. 307 The court may refuse recognition only on those grounds specified in the Uniform International Act.308
5. The general recognition and enforcement section now
reads as follows:
Except as provided by Section 36.005 [Grounds for Nonrecognition], a foreign country judgment that is filed with notice
given as provided by this chapter, that meets the requirement
of Section 36.002 [Applicability], and that is not refused recognition under Section 36.0044 [Recognition and Enforcement] is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it
grants or denies recovery ofa sum of money. Thejudgment is
enforceable in the same manner as ajudgment of a sister state
that is entitled to full faith and credit.309
The Texas "cure" was, in essence, to specify a registration procedure for recognition under the Texas International Act. This
procedure is quite similar to that required by the Uniform Interstate Act when enforcement of a sister state judgment is sought.
The Texas amendment thus provides the missing procedure for
cases in which recognition, either alone or as a prerequisite to
enforcement, is sought under the Texas International Act. No
doubt this is a serviceable solution to the due process problem.
In fact the notice and hearing procedures would appear even to
exceed the minimum standards required by U.S. Supreme Court
decisions. 31o To the extent those protective standards are
exceeded, qualification for recognition abroad of Texas judgments is unnecessarily impaired. The more burdensome the procedure, the weaker the case for reciprocity. But the less
burdensome the procedure, the stronger the case for reciprocity.
The work of the drafter in this area is thus the art of the aerialist.
The balance should be as near to perfect equilibrium as possible.
305. [d. § 36.0044(a).
306. [d. § 36.0044(c).
307. [d. § 36.0044(e).
308. [d. § 36.0044(g). The grounds for nonrecognition are set forth in id. § 36.005.
309. /d. § 36.004 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 206-210.
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An additional problem with the Texas "cure" is that it would
appear to require essentially redundant procedures when recognition and enforcement are sought. Are there alternatives to the
Texas solution? Before answering that question, we turn to the
experience of other states that have adopted the Uniform International Act.
VIII.

EXPERIENCE OF OTHER STATES

Uniform Laws Annotated lists twenty-two states that have
adopted the Uniform International Act: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia,
and Washington. 311
Nineteen of those twenty-two states have also adopted the
1964 Interstate Act. 312 The three who have not are California,
Massachusetts, and Michigan. 313 None of the three has adopted
the 1948 Interstate Act. 314 California has its own Sister State
Money-Judgments Act,315 considered below, so that in Massachusetts and Michigan the effect of the pour-over enforcement provision in the Uniform International Act is to remit the judgment
creditor to a new suit on the originaljudgment. 316 In such cases,
there is obviously no problem with the due process requirement.
It is subsumed and satisfied as part of the new suit. 317
311. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8.
312. 1964 INTERSTATE ACT, supra note 63. at 7 (West Supp. 1992). Those 19 states
are: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Virginia, and Washington. Id.
313. By a process of elimination, California, Massachusetts, and Michigan are the
three states that have not adopted either the 1948 or the 1964 Interstate Acts. UNIFORM
INTERNATIONAL ACT, supra note 8.
314. Id. The status of Missouri is somewhat ambiguous. It has amended its Rules of
Civil Procedure to conform to the 1964 Interstate Act but not as yet its statutes, which
still contain the 1948 Interstate Act. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 511.760 (Vernon 1952 & Supp
1992). Missouri is considered here as under the 1964 Act on the footing that the Missouri Supreme Court's procedural rules prevail over prior inconsistent legislation. For a
comprehensive discussion of recent Missouri reform, see Hartmann, supra note 214, at
529-36.
315. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1710.10-.65 (Deering 1981).
316. See, e.g., Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 405 A.2d 744, 750-51
(Md. 1979) (stating that in Maryland money judgments may be enforced by either a new
suit at common law or through the use of several antiquated common law writs).
317. See Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters., Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.
1990) (holding that when the judgment creditor seeks enforcement by a new suit, the
debtor cannot claim that he has been denied due process).
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Although California now has its own Sister State Money-Judgments Act, modeled on the 1964 Interstate Act but narrower in
scope and departing substantially from it,318 its Uniform International Act expressly excludes resort to the Sister State MoneyJudgments Act for enforcement. 319 Thus the only way to enforce
a foreign country judgment in California is through a new suit on
the foreign judgment, the same as in Massachusetts and
Michigan. 32o
At one time, California was at the opposite end of the recognition-enforcement spectrum. A law enacted in 1907 gave a foreign country judgment the same effect as a judgment rendered in
California. 321 In literal terms, this extended greater effect to the
judgments of foreign countries than to the judgments of sister
states. 322 The purpose was to facilitate the enforcement abroad
of California judgments, especially those against insurance companies for claims arising out of the 1906 earthquake and fire. 323
The experiment began to fail in 1909, when the German courts
found lack of California reciprocity for German judgments, but
the law remained on the books. 324 Its provisions were fairly
regarded as both "much too sweeping" and "ineffective."325 In
practice the literal terms were ignored,326 and a new suit on the
original judgment was in fact required. 327 Then in 1967, foreign
318. See Stephen P. Feldman, The Sister State and Foreign Money-judgments Act of 1974,
50 CAL. ST. BJ. 483 (1975).
319. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1713.3 (Deering 1981). California's Uniform International Act was enacted in 1967, but the express exclusion was not added until 1974,
when the Sister State Money-Judgments Act was enacted. See id. § 1915 law revision
commission cmt. (Supp. 1992); see also infra text accompanying notes 328-329.
320. Review of Selected 1974 California Legislation, 6 PAC. LJ. 125,210-11 (1975) [hereinafter California Legislation]; see also Donald E. McKnight, Jr., Enforcement of a Foreign
Money Judgment in California, 1 CAL. INT'L PRAC. 1, 1-2 (1990) (noting that enforcement in
California requires the filing of an action, but leaving the erroneous impression that
California's insistence on a lawsuit is "uniform" with that of other states that have
enacted the Uniform International Act).
321. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1915 law revision commission cmt. (Supp. 1992)
(§ 1915 was repealed in 1974).
322. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 163 n.25
(1962) (criticizing the scope of § 1915); Gladys L. Schwatka, Comment, Recognition of
Foreign Country Divorces: Is Domicile Really Necessary?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 93 (1952).
323. See Lorenzen, supra note 103, at 204 n.129.
324. Id. at 202-05.
325. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 322, at 163 n.25.
326. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1915 law revision commission cmt. (Supp. 1992) ("Section 1915 . . . has been largely ignored by the courts and has served no useful
purpose.").
327. See Schwatka, supra note 322, at 93 ("Section 1915 is too broad to be applied
according to its literal meaning.... [A] foreign country judgment would always have to
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country money judgments were excluded from the purview of the
1907 Act by adoption of the Uniform International Act. 328 This
meant that foreign country non-money judgments were still
equivalent to California judgments under the 1907 Act but that
foreign country money judgments required a new suit for enforcement. Confusion produced by this anomalous and disparate
treatment was dispelled by repeal of the 1907 Act in 1974. 329
Thus, since 1974, all foreign country judgments require a new
action for enforcement.
The California experience is instructive for two reasons: (1)
sweeping validation of foreign country judgments simply did not
produce the desired effects; and (2) it was nevertheless the model
that was cited and praised by the authors of the Uniform International Act. 330 This raises doubts about the efficacy of the Uniform International Act, and at the same time supports the
conclusion that due process for the enforcement phase was simply taken for granted, without proper consideration. 33 !
Colorado's Uniform International Act, adopted in 1977, is
patently nugatory.332 It comes into play only when the foreign
judgment is rendered in a country with which the United States
has a reciprocal recognition of judgments treaty.333 No such
treaties exist and none are likely in the near future. 334 The essenbe reduced to a California judgment before enforcement in this state, as is required for a
sister state decree."); see also 164 E. Seventy-Second St. Corp. v. Ismay, 151 P.2d 29,30
(Cal. Ct. App. 1944) (distinguishing, in an action to establish an English judgment, execution on a judgment from action to obtain a judgment).
328. CAL. CIV. PRAC. CODE §§ 1713-1713.8 (Deering 1981); see also California Legislation, supra note 320, at 211.
329. California Legislation, supra note 320, at 211. The 1967 Act was amended in
1974, at the time of the adoption of the Sister State Money-Judgments Act, to exclude
resort to the latter as a means of enforcing foreign country judgments. See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1915 law revision commission cmt. (Supp. 1992).
330. 1961 Proceedings, supra note 120, at 4-5 (remarks of Professor Kurt H.
Nadelmann, co-drafter of the Uniform International Act) ("[T]he obvious answer, it
seems to us, is codification. That is what California did ... in 1907.").
331. See supra text accompanying notes 240-241.
332. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-62-101 to -109 (West 1989).
333. The statute defines a "foreign judgment" as a judgment of a "foreign state."
[d. § 13-62-102(2). A "foreign state" is defined as:
any governmental unit other than the United States, any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession thereof, or ... the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands ... which governmental unit has entered into a reciprocal
agreement with the United States recognizing any judgment of a court of record of the United States . . . and providing for procedures similar to those
contained in this article.
[d. § 13-62-102(1).
334. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 5, §§ 481-488 introductory note. The United States and the United Kingdom drafted and initialed a proposed
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tially inoperative character of the legislation is something that
apparently has escaped the notice of commentators. 335
New York was sensitive to the procedural dimension from the
outset. In studies prepared for the Judicial Conference of the
State of New York in 1968, concerning the two Uniform Interstate Acts and the Uniform International Act, it was recommended that the registration procedure of the 1964 Interstate
Act not be used as a pour-over from the Uniform International
Act:
Objection has been made to the suggestion that a registration procedure be made available to foreign judgments, especially if such a procedure should take the form of the Uniform
ForeignJudgments Enforcement Act (Revised 1964 Act), principally on the ground that registration need not be preceded
or accompanied by a judicial determination of the judgment's
validity under foreign or domestic standards. However, the
judgment debtor is notified of the registration and may contest and defeat registration. Unless the judgment creditor is
acting against his own self interest or is engaging in harassing
techniques, he will not seek registration in a place where the
debtor is neither present nor has substantial assets. Thus, in a
normal case, it would seem that no undue burden would be
placed on a judgment debtor. But concededly, the varying
procedural and substantive systems that produce foreign
country judgments reaching these shores may demand separate treatment for enforcement. 336
convention dealing with this issue, but it was never enacted. See United Kingdom-United
States: Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil Matters, Oct. 26, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 71-87 (reprinting an ad referendum copy of the
draft convention); see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 37, at 1007 (describing this unexecuted treaty with the United Kingdom, and stating that the chance for adoption was
"remote"); Woodward, supra note 53, at 322 (containing a 1978 modified version ofthis
proposed United Kingdom treaty). For a description of the United Kingdom's objections to the still unexecuted treaty, see P.M. North, The Draft U.K.IU.S.Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219, 239 (1979) (asserting that "there
will be continued vigorous opposition in the United Kingdom to the implementation of
this draft Convention"). British resistance continues because oflarge U.S. jury verdicts,
fear of class actions and treble damage awards in antitrust actions, and opposition to
long-arm jurisdiction, particularly in so-called split torts, where the manufacturing or
design defect occurs in England (enforcement forum), but the injury occurs in the
United States. LOWENFELD, supra note 26, at 438-39.
335. See, e.g., Mark S. Caldwell, Enforcing Foreign Country Judgments in Colorado, 13
COLO. LAw. 381, 386 (1984) (concluding that "enforcing a foreign judgment will be no
more difficult than enforcing a domestic judgment"); ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS,
supra note 103, at 2 n.8, 28 & n.l (failing to classify Colorado as requiring reciprocity).
336. Barbara Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform
Foreign Money-judgments Recognition Act, 18 BUFF. L. REV. I, 24 n.162 (1969) (a re-publication in substantially identical form of a study prepared for the Judicial Conference of the
State of New York).
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And again, as to enforcement of foreign country judgments
through registration:
It was at first thought that foreign country judgments could be
enforced ... by a registration procedure such as the second
enforcement act provides. Provision is made for notice, so the
judgment debtor would have opportunity to quash the registration proceedings by taking appropriate and timely measures. Since it would be unlikely that the judgment creditor
would seek registration in a state where neither the judgment
debtor nor his property was present, the probability of the
debtor's being unknowingly victimized seemed low. However,
it has been suggested that such a procedure, at least insofar as
it may be made applicable to foreign country judgments, is
unduly burdensome to judgment debtors, especially those
against whom default judgments have been entered. Moreover, concern was expressed that the doors would be opened
to highly questionable judgments emanating from highly
questionable legal systems, all the more dangerous because
the 1964 Act makes no provision for judicial, or even quasijudicial overseeing in the first instance. 337
At no point in the lengthy and thorough consideration of the
three uniform acts by New York did these qualms about notice
and hearing congeal into a question of constitutional magnitude.
Rejection of simple registration was "preferable."338 Simple
registration would be "unduly burdensome" to judgment debtors. 339 It would be "unwise" to allow simple registration. 340
Thus:
It was the feeling of the members of the Committee, shared
by virtually all the experts in the field, to whom the proposed
act was submitted for evaluation, that the benefits of the registration statute in its 1964 version go far beyond the privileges
and courtesies normally extended to foreign country judgments. The registration statute is well suited for the enforcement ofjudgments of courts operating within a federal system
of sister states, but it would be unwise to extend its applicability beyond it.
As Professor Ruth E. Ginsberg [sic Ruth B. Ginsburg] put it
in a letter responding to the Committee's request for comments: "It may be asked whether application of the 1964 Act
to foreign country judgments is not an over-response to the
337. Barbara Kulzer, Programs for Improving Foreign Judgment Enforcement in New York:
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 82-83 (1969) (a republication in substantially identical form of a study prepared for the Judicial Conference of the State of New York).
338. See supra note 242.
339. Kulzer, supra note 337, at 83.
340. Id. at 65.
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high value foreign nations place on abbreviated enforcement
procedures."34I
Then-professor Ginsburg342 had submitted her own proposals
for procedures that are not substantially different from those
adopted as amendments by Texas in 1989. 343 In all of the extensive legislative history for New York's adoption of the 1964 Interstate Act and the Uniform International Act, there are few
references to the constitutional problem; furthermore, those references involve only domestic concerns and are largely dismissive. The Committee to Advise and Consult on the Civil Practice
Law and Rules of New York, for instance, found that "[s]ixteen
years of experience with the federal registration statute apparently have laid to rest any lingering fears as to the constitutionality or feasibility of a streamlined registration procedure at the state
level."344
The product of New York's doubts about feasibility of simple
registration was to amend the Uniform International Act to eliminate the pour-over to the 1964 Interstate Act and to require
enforcement by (1) the traditional method of a new suit on the
judgment, (2) a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, Or (3) a counterclaim, cross-claim, or affirmative defense
in a pending action. 345
The summary judgment motion technique is available generally for other matters, such as judgments and money-only instruments. 346 Questions about the validity of a judgment or the
jurisdiction on which it was based are for the court to decide following notice and hearing. 347
The inclusion of "affirmative defense," although in the sentence concerning "enforcement," obviously refers only to "recognition." This blurring of the distinction is fairly common in
American usage.348
New York thus avoided the constitutional problem by avoiding
the pour-over into the 1964 Uniform Interstate Act. It did this
341. 1969 N.Y. Laws 2287.
342. Ruth B. Ginsburg is currently ajudge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
343. Compare Homburger, supra note 53, at 381 n.89 (summarizing Ginsburg's recommendations) with supra text accompanying notes 302-309 (discussing the 1989 Texas
amendments).
344. 1969 N.Y. Laws 2287 (emphasis added).
345. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 5303 (McKinney 1978).
346. /d. § 3213 (McKinney 1991).
347. See id. practice commentaries § C3213:1-:3 (McKinney 1970).
348. See supra note 22.
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while entirely conscious of the Uniform International Act's principal attraction for New York: to facilitate enforcement of New
York judgments abroad through proof of codified reciprocity.!I49
Statutes and cases from the other states that have adopted the
Uniform International Act and the 1964 Interstate Act shed little
or no light on the problem at hand. The statutes follow the Uniform International Act except for several that either permit or
require refusal to recognize because of lack of a foreign reciprocity.3sO In the cases a few anomalies of interpretation have arisen
that do no more than reveal relatively innocuous carelessness or
confusion as to applicability.3sl
The question is, then, should a state that has or is considering
a "pristine" Uniform International Act follow the example of
349. See, e.g., 1971 N.Y. Laws 2296 (stating that a purpose behind the adoption ofthe
Uniform International Act is "to facilitate proof of reciprocity"); 1970 N.Y. Laws 2784
(stating that "[t]he basic purpose of this proposal is to procure for New York judgments
in foreign countries much better reciprocal treatment at the hands of foreign courts than
they now receive"); 1969 N.Y. Laws 2282 (indicating that the adoption of the Uniform
International Act would be very "beneficial" to commercial activity in the state); see also
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. practice commentaries § C5301:1 (McKinney 1978) (noting that
the aim of New York's adoption of the Act is "to enhance the prospect of recognition of
a New York judgment by foreign courts"). New York's effort has been gauged a success.
See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 103, at 866 (commenting that reciprocity is not a
"serious hurdle ... in view of New York's liberal provision for the enforcement of foreign judgments").
350. Of the 22 states that have adopted some form of the Uniform International Act,
only Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas have included a reference to reciprocity. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-62-102(1) (West 1989) (requiring a reciprocal recognition treaty, discussed supra text accompanying notes 332-335);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114(10) (Michie 1982) (mandating nonrecognition if reciprocity
is unavailable); IDAHO CODE § 10-1404(2)(g) (1990) (classifying the absence ofreciprocity as a discretionary ground for nonrecognition); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 235, § 23A
para. 3(7) (West 1986) (mandating nonrecognition if reciprocity is unavailable); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.92(B) (Anderson 1991) (permitting discretionary nonrecognition if reciprocity is unavailable); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7)
(West 1986) (permitting discretionary nonrecognition if reciprocity is unavailable).
Although New Hampshire has not adopted the Uniform International Act, it has nonetheless codified the concept of reciprocity, but only with respect to Canadian judgments.
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:11 (1974).
351. See, e.g., Blumberg v. Berland, 678 F.2d 1068, 1070 (11th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (relying, for purposes of registering a sister state judgment, erroneously on the
Georgia Uniform International Act); Van Kooten Holding B.V. v. Dumarco Corp., 670
F. Supp. 227, 228 (N.D. III. 1987) (noting that the parties confused the 1948 Interstate
Act and the Uniform International Act on the basis of erroneous prior case law); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Nielson, No. 005515, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1189, at -I (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 8, 1991) (applying Connecticut's Uniform International Act to an interstate judgment); Ross v. Brewer, 805 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (applying
Oklahoma's Uniform International Act to an interstate judgment).
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Texas? Of California? Of New York? Adopt some other
formula? Or just leave well enough alone?

IX.

AN ALTERNATIVE ApPROACH

Texas, California, and New York have dealt in their separate
ways with the Uniform International Act's absence of procedure
for recognizing foreign country judgments. The crux of the Hennessy-Detamore analysis is the failure of the Uniform International
Act to provide an effective pour-over for enforcement to the
1964 Interstate Act. An alternative approach designed to fulfill
the objectives of the Uniform International Act and to cure its
evident textual deficiencies would be as follows. First, each act
should refer to the other. Thus, section 1 of the 1964 Interstate
Act would read:
§ 1. Definition
In this act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree,
or order of a court of the United States or of any other court
which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state, or any foreign judgment as defined in section 1 of the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act. 352

Section 3 of the Uniform International Act would correspondingly read:
§ 3. Recognition and Enforcement
Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment meeting
the requirements of section 2 is conclusive between the parties
to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of
money. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same
manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit. The enforcement procedures provided by the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act are available to a qualifying foreign judgment. 353
352. Cf Kulzer, supra note 337, at 55, 64-65 & n.72 (stating that such an amendment
to the 1948 Interstate Act is not strictly necessary but would alert code-minded civil law
countries that "equality of treatment in enforcement is an actuality"). Professor Kulzer
did not recommend a corresponding amendment to the 1964 Interstate Act since she
rejected a pour-over to simple registration. See supra text accompanying notes 336-337.
The Texas experience would indicate that such an amendment is indeed necessary, in
both Interstate Acts, to ensure correlative functioning with the Uniform International
Act. What is not necessary, however, and even self-defeating, is Professor Kulzer's
phrase "which is entitled to recognition" in modification of "foreign judgment."
Kulzer, supra note 337, at 65. This would preserve the original procedural hiatus. When
would the determination of entitlement be made?
353. Cf. Kulzer, supra note 336, at 20-21, 24 & n.162 (indicating that such an explicit
reference ought to enhance the effects ofthe Uniform International Act abroad). It is, of
course, the burden of this Article that such a reference is not a question of enhancement
but of necessity.
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This still leaves unattended the problem of when the foreign
country judgment is scrutinized for qualification-that is, recognition, whether for purposes of subsequent enforcement or of
recognition standing alone, including an action for declaratory
judgment. This could be covered by adding further to section 3
of the Uniform International Act as follows:
§ 3.

Recognition and Enforcement
Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment meeting
the requirements of section 2 is conclusive between the parties
to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of
money. The conclusive effects ofsuch aforeign judgment shall be determined and recognized in any pending action or in any proceedings for
enforcement. The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same
manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit. The enforcement procedures provided by the
Uniform Enforcement of ForeignJudgments Act are available to a qualifying foreign judgment. 354

The key word in the above amendment is obviously "determined." It is the missing arch that completes the span from
international to interstate. The recognition criteria of the Uniform International Act will now simply be invoked whenever and
wherever relevant to decide the issue.
The foregoing set of amendments would carry out the objectives of the Uniform International Act and cure the HennessyDetamore problem. 355 But are they the best way to do it?

354. This generally matches the formulation of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions for EEC and EITA members. See supra note 134.
355. Amendment of the uniform acts in the above fashion is designed to offer a possible solution to the instant problem with a minimum of disturbance to the current dually
bifurcated statutory scheme of international-versus-interstate and recognition-versusenforcement. For an integrated approach based on a tabula rasa, without federal-state or
other U.S. complications, see Model Act Respecting the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Money-judgments, in REPORT OF THE FIITY-FIRST CONFERENCE HELD AT TOKYO xvii-xxiii
(International Law Association, 1965). The recognition portion of the International
Law Association Model Act was approved at the Hamburg Conference in 1960, and the
enforcement portion was adopted at the Tokyo Conference in 1964. [d. at xvii. The
suggested amendment, moreover, does not attempt to address problems other than
Hennessy and Detamore that might merit attention. A major candidate in that category
might be the use of the words "foreign" and, particularly, "state." In the lexicon of
international law, "state" is quite properly used for "nation-state," but it can lead to
confusion. See cases cited supra note 351. Texas substituted "country" for "state" and
defined it as a governmental unit, not necessarily a nation. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 36.001(1) (West 1986). This is plainer but still comports with orthodox
typology. See 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 22, at 27-28. Problems of this sort are
deferred for another day.
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CONCLUSION

It is possible, of course, that the Hennessy-Detamore analysis is
wrong and that the Uniform International Act is not potentially
unconstitutional. One could simply infer that recognition is to
be granted or denied whenever it is relevant to decide the issue,
including a procedure for enforcement under either of the two
Interstate Acts. Nevertheless, these cases represent a respectable
point of view and therefore a problem that needs to be
addressed.
Any approach to solving the problem should be guided and
informed by the twin policy objectives of producing (l) the most
streamlined procedure that is consistent with the due process
requirements of the United States Constitution, and (2) the
appearance and reality of certainty sufficient to promote the recognition of U.S. judgments abroad.
The California "solution" fails with regard to both objectives.
The New York approach is decidedly better but may provide
more process than is due. Similarly, the recent Texas legislation
would seem, in some circumstances, to require virtually redundant procedures, and, to that extent, the problem may have been
"over-solved." Most states that have adopted the Uniform International Act have not confronted the Hennessy-Detamore problem.
Nor of course have states that have not adopted the uniform legislation. If and when they do, they should seriously consider the
simple solution proposed in Part IX of this Article.

XI.
A.
§ 1.

ApPENDICES

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign judgments Act
(1948 Interstate Act)

Definitions

As used in this Act
(a) "Foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree or
order of a court of the United States or of any State or Territory
which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
(b) "Register" means to [file and] [docket and] [record] a foreign judgment in a court of this state.
(c) "Levy" means to take control of or create a lien upon
property under any judicial writ or process whereby satisfaction
of a judgment may be enforced against such property.
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(d) ''judgment debtor" means the party against whom a foreign judgment has been rendered.
§ 2.

Registration ofJudgment

On application made within the time allowed for bringing an
action on a foreign judgment in this state, any person entitled to
bring such action may have a foreign judgment registered in any
court of this state having jurisdiction of such an action.
§ 3.

Application for Registration

A [verified] [petition] for registration shall set forth a copy of
the judgment to be registered, the date of its entry and the record of any subsequent entries affecting it [such as levies of execution, payments in partial satisfaction and the like] all
authenticated in the manner authorized by the laws of the United
States or of this state, and a prayer that the judgment be registered. The Clerk of the registering court shall notify the clerk of
the court which rendered the original judgment that application
for registration has been made, and shall request him to file this
information with the judgment.
§ 4.

Personal Jurisdiction

At any time after registration the [petitioner] shall be entitled
to have [summons] [issued and] served upon the judgment
debtor as in an action brought upon the foreign judgment, in any
manner authorized by the law of this state for obtaining jurisdiction of the person.
§ 5.

Notice in Absence of Personal Jurisdiction

Ifjurisdiction of the person of the judgment debtor cannot be
obtained, a [notice] [summons] clearly designating the foreign
judgment and reciting the fact of registration, the court in which
it is registered, and the time allowed for pleading, shall be sent
by the Clerk of the registering court by registered mail to the last
known address of the judgment debtor. Proof of such mailing
shall be made by certificate of the Clerk.
§ 6.

Levy

At any time after registration and regardless of whether jurisdiction of the person of the judgment debtor has been secured or
final judgment has been obtained, a levy may be made under the

Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.

794

[Vol. 25

registered judgment upon any property of the judgment debtor
which is subject to execution or other judicial process for satisfaction of judgments.
§ 7.

New Personal Judgment

If the judgment debtor fails to plead within [sixty days] after
jurisdiction over his person has been obtained, or if the court
after hearing has refused to set the registration aside, the registered judgment shall become a final personal judgment of the
court in which it is registered.
§ 8.

Defenses

Any defense [set-off] [counter-claim] [or cross complaint]
which under the law of this state may be asserted by the defendant in an action on the foreign judgment may be presented by
appropriate pleadings and the issues raised thereby shall be tried
and determined as in other civil actions. Such pleadings must be
filed within [sixty days] after personal jurisdiction is acquired
over him or within [sixty days] after the mailing of the notice prescribed in section 5.
§ 9.

Pendency of Appeal

If the judgment debtor shows that an appeal from the original
judgment is pending or that he is entitled and intends to appeal
therefrom, the court shall, on such terms as it thinks just, postpone the trial for such time as appears sufficient for the appeal to
be concluded, and may set aside the levy upon proof that the
defendant has furnished adequate security for satisfaction of the
judgment.
§ 10.

Effect of Setting Aside Registration

An order setting aside a registration constitutes a final Uudgment] in favor of the judgment debtor.
§ 11.

Appeal

An appeal may be taken by either party from any Uudgment]
[order] [or decision] sustaining or setting aside a registration on
the same terms as an appeal for a Uudgment] [order] [or decision] of the same court.
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New Judgment Quasi in Rem

If personal jurisdiction of the judgment debtor is not secured
within [sixty days] after the levy and he has not, within [sixty
days] after the mailing of the notice prescribed by section 5,
acted to set aside the registration [or to assert a set-off] [counterclaim] [or cross-complaint] the registered judgment shall be a
final judgment quasi in rem of the court in which it is registered,
binding upon the judgment debtor's interest in property levied
upon, and the court shall enter an order to that effect.
§ 13.

Sale under Levy

Sale under the levy may be held at any time after final judgment, either personal or quasi in rem, but not earlier except as
otherwise provided by law for sale under levy on perishable
goods. Sale and distribution of the proceeds shall be made in
accordance with the law of this state.
§ 14.

Interest and Costs

When a registered foreign judgment becomes a final judgment
of this state, the court shall include as part of the judgment interest payable on the foreign judgment under the law of the state in
which it was rendered, and the cost of obtaining the authenticated copy of the original judgment. The court shall include as
part of its judgment court costs incidental to the proceeding in
accordance with the law of this state.
§ 15.

Satisfaction ofJudgment

Satisfaction, either partial or complete, of the original judgment or of a judgment entered thereupon in any other state shall
operate to the same extent as satisfaction of the judgment in this
state, except as to costs authorized by section 14.
§ 16.

Optional Procedure

The right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce
his judgment instead of proceeding under this Act remains
unimpaired.
§ 17.

Uniformity of Interpretation

This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it.
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Short Title

This act may be citedas the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act.
§ 19.

Repeal

All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

B.
§ 1.

Uniform Enforcement Of Foreign Judgments Act
(1964 Interstate Act)

Definition

In this Act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree,
or order of a court of the United States or of any other court
which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
§ 2.

Filing and Status of Foreign Judgments

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance
with the act of Congress or the statutes of this state may be filed
in the office of the Clerk of any [District Court of any city or
county] of this state. The Clerk shall treat the foreign judgment
in the same manner as a judgment of the [District Court of any
city or county] of this state. A judgment so filed has the same
effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a
[District Court of any city or county] of this state and may be
enforced or satisfied in like manner.
§ 3.

Notice of Filing

(a) At the time of the filing of the foreign judgment, the judgment creditor or his lawyer shall make and file with the Clerk of
Court an affidavit setting forth the name and last known post
office address of the judgment debtor, and the judgment
creditor.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the
affidavit, the Clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign
judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall
make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice shall
include the name and post office address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this state. In
addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of
the judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mail-
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ing with the Clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the Clerk
shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing
by the judgment creditor has been filed.
[(c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment filed hereunder shall issue until [ ] days after the
date the judgment is filed.]
§ 4.

Stay

(a) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court of any
city or county] that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted,
the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until
the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay
of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment
debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court of any
city or county] any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any [District Court of any city or county] of this state
would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign
judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the same
security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this
state.
§ 5.

Fees

Any person filing a foreign judgment shall pay to the Clerk of
Court
dollars. Fees for docketing, transcription or
other enforcement proceedings shall be as provided for judgments of the [District Court of any city or county of this state].
§ 6.

Optional Procedure

The right of a judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce
his judgment instead of proceeding under this Act remains
unimpaired.
§ 7.

Uniformity of Interpretation

This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it.
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Short Title

This Act may be cited as the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act.
§ 9.

Repeal

The following Acts and parts of Acts are repealed:
(1)

(2)
(3)
§ 10.

Taking Effect

This Act takes effect on - - .

C.

§ 1.

Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recognition Act
(Uniform International Act)

[Definitions]

As used in this Act:
(1) "foreign state" means any governmental unit other than
the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth, territory,
insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands;
(2) "foreign judgment" means any judgment of a foreign
state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than
a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for
support in matrimonial or family matters.
§ 2.

[Applicability]

This Act applies to any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal
therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.
§ 3.

[Recognition and Enforcement]

Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment meeting
the requirements of section 2 is conclusive between the parties to
the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money.
The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the
judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit.
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[Grounds for Non-recognition]
(a)

A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(I) the judgment was rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign
court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of
this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary
to an agreement between the parties under which the
dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case ofjurisdiction based only on personal
service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient
forum for the trial of the action.
§ 5.

[Personal Jurisdiction]
(a)

The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition
for lack of personal jurisdiction if
(I) the defendant was served personally in the foreign
state;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the purpose of protecting
property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court
over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the
proceedings had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of
the foreign court with respect to the subject matter
involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state
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when the proceedings were instituted, or, being a body
corporate had its principal place of business, was incorporated, or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in
the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign
state and the proceedings in the foreign court involved
a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of business done by the defendant through that office in the
foreign state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state and the proceedings involved
a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of such
operation.
(b) The courts of this state may recognize other bases of
jurisdiction.
§ 6.

[Stay in Case of Appeal]

If the defendant satisfies the court either that an appeal is
pending or that he is entitled and intends to appeal from the foreign judgment, the court may stay the proceedings until the
appeal has been determined or until the expiration of a period of
time sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute the appeal.
§ 7.

[Savings Clause]

This Act does not prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this Act.
§ 8.

[Uniformity of Interpretation]

This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
§ 9.

[Short Title]

This Act may be cited as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.
§ 10.

[Repeal]

[The following Acts are repealed:
(1)

(2)
(3)
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[Time of Taking Effect]

This Act shall take effect - - .
D.

Texas Uniform Foreign Country Money-judgment Recognition Act
(Texas International Act)

§ 36.001.

Definitions

In this chapter:
(1) "Foreign country" means a governmental unit
other than:
(A) the United States;
(B) a state, district, commonwealth, territory, or
insular possession of the United States;
(C) the Panama Canal Zone; or
(D) the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(2) "Foreign country judgment" means a judgment of
a foreign country granting or denying a sum of
money other than a judgment for:
(A) taxes, a fine, or other penalty; or
(B) support in a matrimonial or family matter.
§ 36.002.

Applicability

This chapter applies to a foreign country judgment:
(1) that is final and conclusive and enforceable where
rendered, even though an appeal is pending or the
judgment is subject to appeal; or
(2) that is in favor of the defendant on the merits of
the cause of action and is final and conclusive where
rendered, even though an appeal is pending or the
judgment is subject to appeal.
(b) This chapter does not apply to a judgment rendered
before June 17, 1981.
(a)

§ 36.003.

Short Title

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Foreign Country
Money-Judgment Recognition Act.
§ 36.004.

Recognition and Enforcement

Except as provided by Section 36.005, a foreign country judgment that is filed with notice given as provided by this chapter,
that meets the requirements of Section 36.002, and that is not
refused recognition under Section 36.0044 is conclusive between
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the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum
of money. The judgment is enforceable in the same manner as a
judgment of a sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit.
§ 36.0041

Filing

A copy of a foreign country judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of congress, a statute of this state, or a treaty or
other international convention to which the United States is a
party may be filed in the office of the clerk of a court in the
county of residence of the party against whom recognition is
sought or in any other court of competent jurisdiction as allowed
under the Texas venue laws.
§ 36.0042

Affidavit; Notice of Filing

(a) At the time a foreign country judgment is filed, the party
seeking recognition of the judgment or the party's attorney shall
file with the clerk of the court an affidavit showing the name and
last known post office address of the judgment debtor and the
judgment creditor.
(b) The clerk shall promptly mail notice of the filing of the
foreign country judgment to the party against whom recognition
is sought at the address given and shall note the mailing in the
docket.
(c) The notice must include the name and post office address
of the party seeking recognition and that party's attorney, if any,
in this state.
§ 36.0043

Alternate Notice of Filing

(a) The party seeking recognition may mail a notice of the
filing of the foreign country judgment to the other party and may
file proof of mailing with the clerk.
(b) A clerk's lack of mailing the notice of filing does not affect
the conclusive recognition of the foreign country judgment
under this chapter if proof of mailing by the party seeking recognition has been filed.
§ 36.0044

Contesting Recognition

(a) A party against whom recognition of a foreign country
judgment is sought may contest recognition of the judgment if,
not later than the 30th day after the date of service of the notice
of filing, the party files with the court, and serves the opposing
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party with a copy of, a motion for nonrecognition of the judgment on the basis of one or more grounds under Section 36.005.
If the party is domiciled in a foreign country, the party must file
the motion for nonrecognition not later than the 60th day after
the date of service of the notice of filing.
(b) The party filing the motion for nonrecognition shall
include with the motion all supporting affidavits, briefs, and
other documentation.
(c) A party opposing the motion must file any response,
including supporting affidavits, briefs, and other documentation,
not later than the 20th day after the date of service on that party
of a copy of the motion for nonrecognition.
(d) The court may, on motion and notice, grant an extension
of time, not to exceed 20 days unless good cause is shown, for
the filing of a response or any document that is required to establish a ground for nonrecognition but that is not available within
the time for filing the document.
(e) A party filing a motion for nonrecognition or responding
to the motion may request an evidentiary hearing that the court
may allow in its discretion.
(f) The court may at any time permit or require the submission of argument, authorities, or supporting material in addition
to that provided for by this section.
(g) The court may refuse recognition of the foreign country
judgment if the motions, affidavits, briefs, and other evidence
before it establish grounds for nonrecognition as specified in
Section 36.005, but the court may not, under any circumstances,
review the foreign country judgment in relation to any matter not
specified in Section 36.005.
§ 36.005

(a)

Grounds for Nonrecognition

A foreign country judgment is not conclusive if:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system that does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign country court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign country court did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter;
(b) A foreign country judgment need not be recognized if:
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign coun-

Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.

804

[Vol. 25

try court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the cause of action on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign country court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the
dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court;
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign country court was a seriously inconvenient
forum for the trial of the action; or
(7) it is established that the foreign country in which the
judgment was rendered does not recognize judgments rendered in this state that, but for the fact that they are rendered in this state, conform to the definition of "foreign
country judgment."
§ 36.006

(a)

Personal Jurisdiction
A court may not refuse to recognize a foreign country
judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction if:
(I) the defendant was served personally in the foreign
country;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the purpose of protecting
property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court
over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the
proceedings had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of
the foreign country court with respect to the subject
matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign country when the proceedings were instituted or, if the
defendant is a body corporate, had its principal place of
business, was incorporated, or had otherwise acquired
corporate status in the foreign country;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign
country and the proceedings in the foreign country
court involved a cause of action arising out of business
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done by the defendant through that office in the foreign
country; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign country and the proceedings
involved a cause of action arising out of operation of
the motor vehicle or airplane.
(b) A court of this state may recognize other bases of
jurisdiction.
§ 36.007

Stay in Case of Appeal

If the defendant satisfies the court either that an appeal is
pending or that the defendant is entitled and intends to appeal
from the foreign country judgment, the court may stay the proceedings until the appeal has been determined or until a period
of time sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute the appeal
has expired.
§ 36.008

Other Foreign Country Judgments
This chapter does not prevent the recognition of a foreign
country judgment in a situation not covered by this chapter.

